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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI 
 
BACKPAGE.COM, LLC,    ) 
       ) 
Plaintiff,     ) 
       )    
v.       )  Case No. 4:17-CV-01951 
       )  
Attorney General JOSHUA D. HAWLEY, ) 
       ) 
Defendant.     ) 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL JOSHUA D. HAWLEY’S MOTION FOR CRIMINAL 
CONTEMPT AND CIVIL SANCTIONS AGAINST BACKPAGE.COM, LLC AND 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
The Attorney General moves this Court to enter an order requiring Backpage.com, 
LLC (“Backpage”), to show cause why it should not be held in criminal contempt, an 
order requiring Backpage and its counsel to show cause why they should not pay a fee in 
restitution to Backpage’s victims, and an order requiring Backpage and its counsel to 
show cause why this Court should not require them to pay sanctions and the Attorney 
General’s and this Court’s expenses.  Criminal and civil sanctions are warranted because 
the recent criminal plea agreements entered by Backpage and its CEO reveal that this 
lawsuit against the Attorney General was based on false statements and was calculated to 
mislead this Court and impede a lawful investigation.  
In the light of explosive public evidence indicating that Backpage was heavily 
engaged in illegal human trafficking, the Attorney General launched an investigation and 
sought an order in state court to compel Backpage and its CEO, Carl Ferrer, to produce 
documents.  Backpage then filed a federal complaint against the Attorney General and 
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presented itself as an innocent target of a witch hunt.  Backpage assured this Court that it 
was not responsible for the content of any ads for illegal human trafficking on its website.  
Backpage assured this Court that it never knowingly permitted illegal ads to remain on its 
website because it deleted all ads for illegal human trafficking that came to its attention.  
Backpage assured this Court that it worked closely with law enforcement officials to 
investigate individuals who misused its website.  And Backpage assured this Court that 
all its conduct was immune under the federal Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 
which protects providers of Internet forums from liability when they have no involvement 
in creating, “in whole or in part,” unlawful content that third parties post to its website. 
47 U.S.C. § 230(c). 
These assertions were false.  Backpage’s recent plea agreements demonstrate their 
falsity.  In April, Backpage pleaded guilty in Texas state court to human trafficking and 
in Arizona federal court to conspiracy to commit money laundering.  In sworn statements 
before those courts, Backpage admitted that its public defense was a fiction.  Backpage 
confessed that it engaged in human trafficking and money laundering activity, that none 
of this activity was protected under the CDA, and that it consistently impeded efforts by 
law enforcement to investigate human trafficking activity.  While Backpage was telling 
this Court that it was the innocent victim of a witch hunt and that it removed all illegal 
content that came to its attention, it was quietly trafficking an untold number of victims 
and fabricating shell companies to launder millions of dollars in ill-gotten proceeds. 
Backpage based its lawsuit in this Court on false statements that were intended to impede 
and delay the Attorney General’s lawful investigation. 
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The most appropriate form of sanction against Backpage is criminal contempt.  
Because Backpage has already pleaded guilty in other jurisdictions to human trafficking 
and money laundering, collecting a monetary award may prove difficult or impossible.  
But this Court can impose the stigma of criminal contempt on Backpage to serve the 
purpose of general deterrence against other parties who may be tempted to try similar 
vexatious conduct. This Court should also impose other monetary sanctions on Backpage. 
JURISDICTION 
Although this Court no longer retains jurisdiction over the merits of the underlying 
suit, the Court has jurisdiction to issue sanctions.  The Supreme Court has squarely held 
that courts may impose sanctions and hold parties in contempt even “after the principal 
suit has been terminated” because a sanctions order “requires the determination of a 
collateral issue,” not consideration of the merits.  Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 
U.S. 384, 396 (1990); accord Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 
58 (1982) (per curiam) (“The filing of a notice of appeal . . . divests the district court of 
its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” (emphasis added)). 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
I. The Attorney General launches an investigation into Backpage’s 
engagement in human trafficking.  
Until federal authorities seized the website in April 2018, Backpage hosted 
www.backpage.com, which ostensibly allowed users to post advertisements for ordinary 
goods and services.  But Backpage obtained 99 percent of its revenue from 
advertisements for commercial sex, including illegal human trafficking of underage girls, 
Case: 4:17-cv-01951-PLC   Doc. #:  73   Filed: 07/16/18   Page: 3 of 26 PageID #: 1051
 4 
 
and obtained more than $3 million each week.  Doc. 21 at 3.  Its role in human trafficking 
was so substantial that Backpage was “involved in 73% of all child trafficking reports 
that the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) receive[d] from 
the general public.”  Id. at 2.  
Backpage never denied that its website was a hub for illegal activity.  Instead, 
“Backpage represented to the public and the courts that it merely hosted content others 
had created.”  Id. at 5 (emphasis added).  Under the Communications Decency Act 
(“CDA”), an Internet forum provider is liable for any content it creates “in whole or in 
part,” but not for content created and posted entirely by third parties.  47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(1), (f)(3).  For years, Backpage insisted that it had no involvement with human 
trafficking or advertisements for illegal human trafficking and that everything it did was 
thus protected by the CDA.  Doc. 21 at 3. 
The Attorney General uncovered substantial, compelling evidence indicating that 
Backpage’s public defense was a fiction, that Backpage created advertisements for illegal 
human trafficking, and that Backpage actively facilitated creation of unlawful content by 
others with the intent and purpose of promoting human trafficking.  This evidence 
suggested that Backpage was involved in other unlawful practices, such as deceiving 
credit-card companies about its identity or practices so that it could continue to process 
transactions through companies that otherwise would not wish to associate with 
Backpage.  Doc. 21 at 19–20.  The Attorney General launched a full-scale investigation 
to determine the extent of Backpage and Ferrer’s violations of Missouri law.  As part of 
this investigation, the Attorney General issue two separate Civil Investigative Demands 
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or “CIDs” to Backpage and Ferrer.  Doc. 21 at 9–10; Mo. Rev. Stat. § 407.040.  The 
deadline for complying with these CIDs was June 7, 2017, for Backpage, and July 7, 
2017, for Ferrer.  Backpage and Ferrer never complied.  Id. 
II. Backpage files a vexatious lawsuit in this Court based on statements that it 
knew were false. 
Four days after the Attorney General filed suit in state court to enforce the CIDs, 
Backpage sued the Attorney General in federal court, asking this Court to enjoin the state 
court from considering the petition to enforce the CIDs.  Doc. 1.  Backpage’s complaint 
was fraudulent from the outset.  Even while it was raking in millions of dollars by 
knowingly promoting human trafficking, Backpage told this Court that the investigation 
was merely a witch hunt by the Attorney General “to impose liability for speech he 
disfavors.”  Doc. 1 ¶ 62.  
Backpage’s lawsuit was calculated to deceive this Court.  It constructed its 
complaint atop a central false edifice: all of Backpage’s conduct was supposedly 
protected by the CDA and the First Amendment, so the Attorney General could not even 
investigate Backpage, much less bring an enforcement action against it.  Specifically, 
Backpage assured this Court that it never engaged in “affirmative participation in an 
illegal venture,” id. ¶ 34; that it engaged only in “conduct expressly protected by Section 
230,” id. ¶ 48; and that everything it knowingly permitted on its website was “protected 
speech under the First Amendment,” id. ¶ 41. 
Backpage acknowledged that some illegal content was on its website, but it 
insisted that it had no involvement in the “creation and development” of those ads, and 
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that it never knowingly permitted ads for illegal human trafficking to remain on its 
website.  Backpage assured this Court that it would “block and remove content that 
violates the website’s rules or may be improper;” that it would “prohibit[] illegal content 
and activity on its website and take[] extensive steps to prevent such misuse, especially to 
guard against any form of trafficking or child exploitation;” and that it would “manually 
review ads” to “remove those” that advertised for illegal content.  Id. ¶¶ 21–22.  
Backpage also asserted that it would report any suspected illegal activity to law 
enforcement. Id.  
Each of these assertions was false, and Backpage made these assertions knowing 
they were false.  Backpage’s public defense was never compelling to begin with.  It relied 
on specious assertions that conflicted with the vast array of public evidence indicating 
that Backpage was heavily engaged in human trafficking.  But to the extent its public 
defense had any level of credibility, that defense evaporated entirely in April 2018 when 
Backpage and its CEO, Carl Ferrer, pleaded guilty to federal and state criminal charges 
and admitted that they had long engaged in conduct outside the protection of the CDA. 
Backpage pleaded guilty in a Texas state court to human trafficking and in federal 
court to a money laundering conspiracy.  Ex. A (federal court); Ex. B (state court); see 
also Texas Att’y Gen., Backpage.com Pleads Guilty to Human Trafficking in Texas 
(April 12, 2018).1  Ferrer pleaded guilty to conspiracy to facilitate prostitution.  U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, Backpage’s Co-founder and CEO, as Well as Several Backpage-Related 
                                                 
1 https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/backpage.com-pleads-guilty-to-
human-trafficking-in-texas. 
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Corporate Entities, Enter Guilty Pleas (April 12, 2018).2  Federal authorities also brought 
a 93-count indictment against seven Backpage officials.  Alina Selyukh, Backpage 
Founders Indicted on Charges of Facilitating Prostitution, Nat’l Pub. Radio (April 9, 
2018).3  
The plea agreements reveal that Backpage’s lawsuit in this Court was based on 
false statements, and that Backpage’s only purposes in suing the Attorney General were 
to mislead this Court and cause delay.  Backpage told this Court that it engaged only in 
lawful conduct protected by the First Amendment and the Communications Decency Act.  
But in a sworn statement in a plea agreement, Backpage admitted that the purpose of the 
organization was to “knowingly facilitate the state-law prostitution crimes” on its 
website.  Ex. A at 11.  Backpage told this Court that it removed any illegal content that 
came to its attention.  But it admitted in sworn statements that it knew that “[t]he great 
majority of the[] advertisements are, in fact, advertisements for prostitution services,” and 
that it did not remove or block this content.  Id.  Backpage told this Court that it worked 
with law enforcement to eliminate illegal content from its website.  Doc. 1 ¶ 22.  But 
Backpage admitted in its plea agreement that it instead had a “policy of concealing” its 
human-trafficking activities from the public and from law enforcement.  Ex. A at 11.  In 
its plea agreement, Backpage admitted under oath that its editing practices “were only 
one component of an overall, company-wide culture and policy of concealing and 
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refusing the true nature of the services being offered” on Backpage’s website, and that its 
editing practices were “merely intended to create a veneer of deniability for Backpage.”  
Id.  Evidently, that policy of deception extended to concealing these facts from this Court 
even as Backpage was assuring this Court that it was merely the innocent victim of a 
witch hunt. 
Backpage’s deception went beyond lying about its human-trafficking activities.  It 
also lied to this Court when it asserted that it was forthcoming with all companies with 
which it did business.  The Attorney General investigated Backpage in part because the 
evidence indicated that Backpage was misrepresenting itself to deceive merchants and 
consumers into doing business with Backpage when they would prefer not to engage in 
commercial transactions with a company engaged in human trafficking.  Doc. 21 at 19–
20.  Such misrepresentations violate the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act (MMPA). 
Id.  Backpage responded by saying that it was honest and forthcoming with all consumers 
and merchants, and thus that the Attorney General could not “prosecute—or threaten to 
prosecute—Backpage.com under the MMPA or any other law.”  Doc. 1 ¶ 51; see also id. 
¶ 46 (asserting that “the State is precluded from pursuing civil claims or prosecuting 
Backpage.com”).  But in its sworn federal plea agreement, Backpage admitted that these 
assertions were false.  It was not forthcoming with merchants and consumers, but instead 
it “conspired to engage in various money laundering offenses” to deceive such entities.  
Ex. A at 12.  It admitted that it constructed an elaborate series of shell companies to “fool 
credit card companies into believing that Backpage-associated charges were being 
incurred on different websites.”  Id. 
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In addition, Backpage admitted under oath in Texas state court that it “knowingly 
receive[d] a benefit from participating in a venture that involved the trafficking of . . . a 
child younger than 18 years of age,” thereby causing that child to become a victim of 
compelled prostitution.  Ex. B at 3.  It also admitted under oath that it engaged in money 
laundering the proceeds of criminal human trafficking.  Id. at 4. 
In short, while Backpage was telling this Court that it was an innocent victim of a 
witch hunt and that its conduct was beyond reproach under federal law, it was quietly 
trafficking an untold number of victims and fabricating shell companies to launder its ill-
begotten proceeds.  Backpage based its entire lawsuit in this Court on false statements 
intended to deceive this Court and delay the Attorney General’s investigation so it could 
rake in more money at the expense of its victims. 
III. Backpage compounds its fraudulent complaint. 
Not satisfied simply with filing a suit centered on false statements, Backpage 
made every effort to divert the Attorney General’s resources to fighting this frivolous 
suit.  Shortly after filing its complaint, Backpage moved for a preliminary injunction. 
Doc. 11.  Backpage again told this Court that it engaged in no unlawful conduct, that 
everything it did was protected by the CDA, and that the Attorney General thus could not 
“pursu[e] or threaten[] other action against Backpage” in good faith.  Id. at 3.  
Faced with Backpage’s aggressive litigation tactics, the Attorney General had to 
file a brief opposing Backpage’s motion for a preliminary injunction, and the Attorney 
General also had to file a motion to dismiss to prevent this frivolous litigation from 
progressing.  In response to the motion to dismiss, Backpage continued to make false 
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assertions.  The Attorney General presented this Court with evidence that Backpage 
identified advertisements that included buzzwords indicating that the advertisements 
were for unlawful human trafficking, such as “teenage,” “rape,” “little girl,” “Lolita,” 
“fresh,” “school girl,” and even “Amber Alert.”  Doc. 21 at 4.  The evidence indicated 
that Backpage was scrubbing these buzzwords from the ads and then reposting them, 
making it more difficult for law enforcement to detect that these advertisements were for 
illegal conduct, while still exposing underage victims of human trafficking to coerced 
commercial sexual exploitation.  Backpage responded by asserting that all it did was 
modify ads “from being illegal to legal.”  Doc. 34 at 24.  But in its federal plea 
agreement, Backpage admitted that these “edits” were part of an overarching “policy of 
concealing” these posts from law enforcement “to create a veneer of deniability for 
Backpage,” so that Backpage could continue to rake in millions of dollars from these 
illegal transactions.  Ex. A at 11.   
Compounding its vexatious conduct even more, after the parties briefed the motion 
to dismiss and before this Court ruled on the motion, Backpage filed a second motion for 
preliminary injunctive relief on different issues.  Doc. 48.  In doing so, Backpage again 
forced the Attorney General to divert additional resources to fight its bad-faith lawsuit. 
When the Attorney General prevailed in this Court, Backpage delayed proceedings 
further by appealing this Court’s judgment to the Eighth Circuit.  Backpage’s deceit 
continued in that forum.  There, it again falsely asserted that it “removes content that 
violates its posting rules or may be improper.”  Ex. C at 2–3 (Backpage’s brief on 
appeal).  It falsely asserted that, when it uncovered posts for illegal human trafficking, it 
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“reported [those posts] to law enforcement.”  Id. at 3.  These statements stand in stark 
contrast to its admission in one of its plea agreements that its purpose was to “knowingly 
facilitate the state-law prostitution crimes” on its website and that it had an overarching 
“policy of concealing” its actions from law enforcement, consumers, and merchants.  Ex. 
A at 11.  Backpage again repeated its false assertion that its intent in scrubbing 
buzzwords from ads was merely to convert those ads “from being illegal to legal.”  Ex. C 
at 36–37.  
Backpage’s appeal to the Eighth Circuit was fully briefed, resulting in a significant 
expenditure of resources by the Attorney General’s Office.  But shortly after Backpage’s 
plea agreements were unsealed, publicly revealing that Backpage’s statements were false, 
Backpage’s counsel withdrew from the appeal, as well as other cases in which they were 
representing Backpage.  Ex. D.  The Eighth Circuit warned Backpage that the court 
would dismiss the appeal for lack of prosecution if Backpage did not enter counsel by 
June 14, 2018.  Backpage never did so, and then Backpage failed to respond to the Eighth 
Circuit’s motion to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of 
prosecution.  On July 10, 2018, the Eighth Circuit dismissed Backpage’s appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. This Court should impose sanctions against Backpage and its counsel 
under the inherent authority of this Court. 
Although numerous rules and statutes enable this Court to impose sanctions, this 
Court need not rely on those provisions, and this Court is not constrained to follow the 
procedures required by those provisions.  Instead, “the inherent power of a court can be 
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invoked even if procedural rules exist which sanction the same conduct.”  Chambers v. 
NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 49 (1991).  
This Court should issue sanctions under its inherent powers because Backpage’s 
deception infected the entire case.  Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
enables this Court to issue sanctions, but that Rule is tailored toward addressing 
misconduct that occurs in individual filings.  Inherent powers are better suited where, as 
here, the nonmoving party’s “entire course of conduct throughout the lawsuit evidenced 
bad faith and an attempt to perpetrate a fraud on the court.”  Id. at 51.  Backpage’s 
misconduct is not limited to a single pleading.  Its false statements served as the linchpin 
for the entire lawsuit.  This Court’s inherent powers give this Court greater flexibility to 
address the sanctionable conduct that infected the entire lawsuit.  
A. The evidence provides substantial justification to sanction Backpage.  
Backpage’s conduct warrants sanctions under this Court’s inherent authority 
because Backpage repeatedly lied to this Court.  “Making misrepresentations to the fact 
finder is inherently obstructive . . . .”  United States v. Thoreen, 653 F.2d 1332, 1340 (9th 
Cir. 1981).  Thus, the Supreme Court “ha[s] consistently indeed without exception 
allowed sanctions for false statements.”  United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 577 
(1976).  Central to Backpage’s Complaint were its allegations that it had no active 
involvement in human trafficking, that it went to great pains to remove illegal content 
from its website, and that it was forthcoming with merchants and consumers about all its 
activities.  Each of those central assertions was false, and Backpage knew those 
assertions were false the whole time.  Backpage has now admitted under oath that its 
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purpose was to “knowingly facilitate” human trafficking on its website, that it took every 
opportunity to conceal its actions from law enforcement, and that it constructed a 
labyrinth of shell organizations to “fool credit card companies into believing” they were 
doing business with somebody else.  Ex. A at 11–12.  Backpage has also admitted that at 
least some of its victims were minors. Ex. B at 3. 
These false statements caused harm not only to the Attorney General and to 
Backpage’s victims, but also to this Court.  On their own, false statements obstruct the 
truth-seeking function of the courts.  Thoreen, 653 F.2d at 1340.  When false statements 
serve as the linchpin for an entire lawsuit, the obstruction is more severe.  But for 
Backpage’s false statements, the lawsuit never would have existed.  Backpage’s entire 
theory of this case was premised on fraud.  Backpage’s filing of a lawsuit premised on 
intentionally false statements constituted “a wrong against the institutions set up to 
protect and safeguard the public, institutions in which fraud cannot complacently be 
tolerated consistently with the good order of society.” Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v. Hartford-
Empire Co., 322 U.S. 238, 246 (1944).  
To rectify these harms, this Court should use its inherent powers to impose at least 
three sanctions on Backpage: fines for criminal contempt, an award of attorney’s and 
court fees, and penalties and fees paid into a fund for restitution to human-trafficking 
victims; as well as any other criminal or civil sanctions that this Court deems just and 
proper. 
First, this Court should hold Backpage in criminal contempt and impose punitive 
sanctions for abuse of the judicial process.  Backpage abused the judicial process when it 
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initiated a civil lawsuit predicated on falsehoods to impede a lawful investigation into 
Backpage’s criminal activity.  Although attorney’s fees awards “must be compensatory 
rather than punitive in nature,” courts can impose punitive sanctions both through their 
inherent powers and by statute.  See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Haeger, 137 S. Ct. 
1178, 1182 (2017).  Courts can also impose punitive sanctions—which are criminal in 
nature—without formally holding parties in contempt.  Id.  
Several statutes enable this Court to hold Backpage in criminal contempt for its 
“disobedience or resistance to [the Court’s] process.”  18 U.S.C. §§ 401–02; accord 42 
U.S.C. § 1995.  The Eighth Circuit routinely upholds such sanctions.  E.g., Isaacson v. 
Manty, 721 F.3d 533, 541 (8th Cir. 2013) (upholding imposition of ten criminal contempt 
sanctions, one for each false statement).  But this Court’s inherent powers give even 
broader authority to hold Backpage in criminal contempt. Int’l Union, United Mine 
Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 831 (1994) (“Courts . . . have embraced an 
inherent contempt authority.”). 
Holding Backpage in criminal contempt and imposing fines—or even merely 
imposing punitive fines without a formal holding of criminal contempt—are appropriate 
sanctions for Backpage.  Backpage’s conduct went far beyond merely imposing costs on 
this Court and the Attorney General.  Those harmed most by Backpage’s vexatious delay 
are Backpage’s human trafficking victims, who cannot be numbered and who include 
countless young girls forced into the horrors of underage prostitution on Backpage’s 
website.  See, e.g., Tom Jackson, et al., 16-Year-Old Was Found Beaten, Stabbed to 
Death After Being Advertised as Prostitute on Backpage, Washington Post (July 11, 
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2017).4 By repeatedly lying to this Court so that Backpage could continue its crimes, 
Backpage criminally abused the judicial process. 
Civil sanctions alone would not sufficiently deter Backpage or parties situated 
similarly to Backpage.  Because Backpage is a company, not an individual, this Court 
cannot incarcerate Backpage after holding it in criminal contempt.  But because 
Backpage has already pleaded guilty to crimes in other jurisdictions, collecting a 
monetary fine may be difficult.  Punitive sanctions—which are criminal in character—are 
thus most appropriate because they impose a stigma and warn individuals that this Court 
can imprison those individuals for similarly vexatious conduct.  Imposing criminal 
sanctions would serve general deterrence purposes because it would send a signal that 
courts will not tolerate flagrant abuses of the judicial process.5 
Second, this Court should order Backpage to pay the Attorney General’s fees and 
costs and also to pay to the Clerk of this Court the costs associated with adjudicating its 
frivolous lawsuit.  “If a plaintiff initiates a case in complete bad faith, so that every cost 
of defense is attributable only to sanctioned behavior, the court may again make a blanket 
award.”  Haeger, 137 S. Ct. at 1188.  Between responding to two different motions for 
preliminary injunctions, briefing a motion to dismiss, and fully briefing an appeal, the 




5 If this Court determines that criminal contempt and punitive fines are appropriate, it 
must give Backpage the protection of criminal procedures, including the heightened 
burden of proof for criminal convictions. Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 834. But this Court will 
not need to give Backpage the benefit of a jury trial as long as the fines assessed for each 
violation are not exorbitant. Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 475–76 (1975). 
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Attorney General’s Office has needlessly expended hundreds of hours of resources due to 
Backpage’s fraudulent behavior.  
Third, this Court should require Backpage to pay a substantial fee into a fund for 
victims of Backpage’s crimes.  This Court possesses “a large measure of discretion in 
deciding what sanctions are appropriate for misconduct.”  Hutchins v. A.G. Edwards & 
Sons, Inc., 116 F.3d 1256, 1260 (8th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted); accord Adkins v. 
Wolever, 554 F.3d 650, 651 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding that “a federal court’s inherent 
powers include broad discretion to craft proper sanctions”); Chambers, 501 U.S. at 45 
(holding that “even a particularly severe sanction . . . is within the court’s discretion”).  
Although Backpage’s false statements have caused substantial inconvenience to the 
Attorney General and this Court, this inconvenience pales in comparison to the ongoing 
injuries inflicted on those hit hardest by Backpage’s behavior—Backpage’s human-
trafficking victims, who continued to suffer harm while Backpage took every opportunity 
to drag out legal proceedings and delay investigation as long as possible.  Although a 
victim of a crime as horrific as those crimes Backpage perpetrated can never be 
“compensated,” this Court should order Backpage to pay a significant fee to fund 
restitution to its victims. 
B. This Court should use its inherent authority to impose civil sanctions on 
Backpage’s counsel.  
This Court should require Backpage’s counsel, the lawyers of the law firm Davis 
Wright Tremaine LLP, to reimburse the Attorney General and this Court for their 
expenses, and the Court should impose other civil sanctions on these attorneys as well. 
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These counsel falsely asserted on behalf of Backpage that Backpage was not directly 
involved in any human trafficking conduct and that it engaged only in lawful activity.  
Counsel cannot evade responsibility for these false statements merely by claiming that 
Backpage deceived them or that they were unaware of Backpage’s illegal activities.  An 
attorney is obligated to “conduct a reasonable inquiry of the factual and legal basis for a 
claim before filing.”  Coonts v. Potts, 316 F.3d 745, 753 (8th Cir. 2003).  “To constitute a 
reasonable inquiry, the prefiling investigation must uncover a factual basis for the 
plaintiff’s allegations, as well as a legal basis.”  Id.  
Even assuming that counsel did not know that its assertions on behalf of Backpage 
were false, counsel made those assertions in the face of numerous red flags that would 
have cautioned any reasonable attorney to engage in a thorough investigation before 
filing its vexatious lawsuit.  First, in October 2016, months before Backpage filed suit in 
this Court, its CEO, Carl Ferrer, was arrested on human trafficking charges, and arrest 
warrants were issued for numerous other Backpage officials.  E.g., Don Thompson & 
Terry Wallace, Backpage.com Raided, CEO Arrested for Sex-Trafficking, Assoc. Press 
(Oct. 6, 2016).6  These events indicated that, at the very least, some States had probable 
cause to believe that Backpage was engaging in human trafficking activity or other 
actions not immunized by federal law. 
Second, two months after Ferrer’s arrest, he was indicted again—this time on 
charges that he had duped credit card companies by setting up sham shell organizations to 
trick credit card companies into believing they were doing business with somebody else.  
                                                 
6 https://apnews.com/2d89a01c2ff14106beeb7570747c46af. 
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See Ex. E.  Counsel for Backpage in this proceeding knew of these charges because they 
represented Backpage in the criminal proceedings in California.  See, e.g., Ex. F.  This 
new indictment should have cautioned Backpage’s counsel that they needed to conduct a 
thorough factual inquiry before making the spurious allegations in this case.  Instead, 
even while they knew Ferrer had been indicted for misrepresenting Backpage to credit 
card companies, counsel falsely asserted on behalf of Backpage that Backpage was fully 
compliant with the Missouri Merchandising Practices Act, which penalizes the 
laundering schemes to which Ferrer and Backpage have pleaded guilty. 
Third, two months later, on January 19, 2017, a permanent subcommittee of the 
U.S. Senate released an explosive report indicating that Backpage was engaged in 
substantial human trafficking activity.  The report stated that Backpage is “aptly 
described” “as a ‘hub’ of ‘human trafficking, especially the trafficking of minors,’” 
because “Backpage is involved in 73% of all child trafficking reports that the National 
Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC) receives from the general public.”  
Doc. 21 at 3.  It reported that 99 percent of the revenue Backpage obtained was from 
advertisements for commercial sex, including illegal human trafficking of underage girls, 
and obtained more than $3 million each week.  Id.  And it found that Backpage 
affirmatively concealed illegal ads from law enforcement.  Backpage would identify ads 
that include key buzzwords indicating that a victim is underage, such as “teenage,” 
“rape,” “little girl,” “Lolita,” “fresh,” “school girl,” and even “Amber Alert.”  Doc. 21 at 
4.  Then, knowing that those advertisements were for illegal, forcible sex trafficking, 
Backpage helped third parties revise and alter the content of those ads.  Backpage 
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scrubbed the buzzwords from the ads, developing the ads into more effective ads that 
masked their illegal nature from law enforcement officials who know to look for those 
buzzwords.  Doc. 21-8 at 8–10; 85–106.   
This report wholly undermined Backpage’s public defense, but its lawyers 
reiterated that defense as officers of this Court.  Backpage’s lawyers assured this Court 
that Backpage deleted ads for human trafficking, Doc. 1 ¶¶ 21–22, but the Senate report 
indicated instead that Backpage was an active participant in creating those ads and that it 
did not delete ads that it knew were advertisements for human trafficking.  Instead, 
Backpage concealed those ads from law enforcement.  Backpage admitted in its plea 
agreement that these “edits” were part of an overarching “policy of concealing” these 
posts from law enforcement so it could continue to rake in profits from these illegal 
advertisements for human trafficking.  Ex. A at 11.  
Fourth, shortly after the Senate released this report, documents published by the 
Washington Post further confirmed that Backpage was involved in rampant illegal 
conduct.  Those documents showed that Backpage operated outside the protection of the 
Communications Decency Act by creating illegal advertisements to entice advertisers to 
switch from competitor websites to Backpage.  An internal Backpage manual describes 
how Backpage agents trawled the Internet for ads for illegal human trafficking, created 
ads similar to those found on competitor websites, and sent the newly created ads to the 
users of those competitor sites with offers to publish the Backpage-created ads for free.  
See, e.g., Doc. 21-15 at 22, 34.  The manual directed agents to “pre-board” the Backpage-
created ads onto Backpage.com and then send a scripted email to the user of competitor 
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websites that stated, “If you’d like to see the free ad I’ve already created for you look at 
the next email . . . .”  Doc. 21-16 at 1 (emphasis added).  By creating ads for illegal 
services that Backpage hosted for free, Backpage attempted to entice users of competitor 
websites to switch to Backpage, where they then paid for later ads. 
The documents also revealed that Backpage created illegal advertisements to 
entice persons seeking to purchase illegal sex trafficking services to visit Backpage’s 
website.  Backpage “created phony sex ads, offering to ‘Let a young babe show you the 
way’ or ‘Little angel seeks daddy,’ adding photos of barely clad women and explicit sex 
patter.”  Doc. 21-10 at 1.  “Then, when a potential customer expressed interest, an email 
directed that person to Backpage.com, where they would find authentic ads . . . .”  Id.  In 
other words, Backpage created illegal advertisements for phony sex trafficking to draw in 
web users and redirect them to advertisements where actual persons—especially young 
girls—became victims. 
Backpage’s counsel knew of the many indictments.  They knew about the U.S. 
Senate report.  And they knew about the documents obtained and published by the 
Washington Post.  Yet they nonetheless repeatedly asserted the outlandish and false 
statements that Backpage was fully compliant with the law, that it never took part in 
human trafficking, that it removed all illegal content that came to its attention, that it 
worked closely with law enforcement officials to expose and uncover criminals using its 
site, and that the Attorney General had no good-faith basis to launch an investigation.  
Backpage’s counsel either relayed false statements on behalf of Backpage with full 
knowledge that those statements were false, or counsel willfully ignored overwhelming 
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public evidence that the assertions it was making were false.  In either case, sanctions are 
warranted.  “Sticking one’s head in the sand is more than undignified. It is sanctionable.” 
Khalil v. Town of Cicero, 916 F.2d 715 (7th Cir. 1990).  
II. This Court should also impose sanctions against Backpage’s counsel under 
28 U.S.C. § 1927. 
This Court should also impose sanctions against Backpage’s counsel under the 
authority granted to this Court by statutory law.  Section 1927 enables this Court to award 
attorney’s fees where counsel “multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and 
vexatiously.”  28 U.S.C. § 1927.  Sanctionable conduct under this provision occurs 
“when attorney conduct, viewed objectively, manifests either intentional or reckless 
disregard of the attorney’s duties to the court.”  Lee v. First Lenders Ins. Servs., Inc., 236 
F.3d 443, 445 (8th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted).  “If a lawyer pursues a path that a 
reasonably careful attorney would have known, after appropriate inquiry, to be unsound, 
the conduct is objectively unreasonable and vexatious.”  Dal Pozzo v. Basic Mach. Co., 
463 F.3d 609, 614 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).  Sanctions under this section are 
especially appropriate where, as here, an attorney’s actions infect a larger “course of 
conduct,” not just a single signed filing.  United States v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen & Helpers of Am., AFL-CIO, 948 F.2d 1338, 1346 (2d Cir. 
1991). 
Backpage’s counsel unnecessarily multiplied the proceedings in three ways.  First, 
they filed a suit that was centered on false statements.  “[A] court may infer 
[sanctionable] intent from a total lack of factual or legal basis for a suit.”  Walter v. 
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Fiorenzo, 840 F.2d 427, 433 (7th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted).  Backpage’s counsel 
forced the Attorney General to respond to two motions for preliminary injunctive relief 
and forced the Attorney General to fully litigate an appeal (except for oral argument), 
before withdrawing and abandoning the litigation effort.  Yet this entire lawsuit, from the 
outset, rested on statements that Backpage’s counsel either knew or should have known 
were false.  This case is much worse than cases where a false statement infects some 
ancillary matter in litigation.  This entire case would not have existed, but for the false 
statements central to the complaint. 
Moreover, this litigation in Missouri is only part of a long campaign by 
Backpage’s attorneys to defend Backpage from the natural consequences of its appalling 
illegal behavior.  In its filings in this court, Backpage’s counsel repeatedly touted 
Backpage’s legal victories in other cases throughout the country, where they had 
successfully employed their CDA defense to thwart efforts by law-enforcement 
authorities and private plaintiffs to hold Backpage accountable for human trafficking.  No 
doubt Backpage’s attorneys profited handsomely in legal fees from these efforts.  But, as 
Backpage’s guilty pleas now demonstrate, all these efforts were premised on the same 
falsehoods that infected Backpage’s litigation here.  And while Backpage’s highly 
compensated attorneys profited handsomely from defending Backpage’s conduct for 
years, underage boys and girls continued to suffer the horrors of commercial sexual 
exploitation in untold numbers.  Backpage’s attorneys should not escape personal 
responsibility for their actions.  This Court should issue sanctions them. 
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III. In the alternative, this Court should grant leave to expedite a motion for 
Rule 11 sanctions. 
“Rule 11 sanctions may be warranted when a pleading is ‘presented for any 
improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in 
the cost of litigation,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(1), contains allegations or factual contentions 
that lack evidentiary support, Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(3), or contains denials of factual 
contentions that are not warranted on the evidence. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(4).”  Clark v. 
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 460 F.3d 1004, 1008 (8th Cir. 2006).  Even a single false 
statement in a pleading can justify sanctions.  See Perkins v. Gen. Motors Corp., 965 F.2d 
597, 601 (8th Cir. 1992); cf. In re Young, 789 F.3d 872, 875 (8th Cir. 2015) (affirming 
sanctions imposed on counsel for, among other things, falsely stating that counsel’s client 
was complying with alimony requirements).  
For the reasons explained above, Backpage and its counsel engaged in substantial 
conduct warranting sanctions under Rule 11.  The complaint, two motions for preliminary 
injunctive relief, and each of the briefs and memoranda Backpage submitted included or 
relied on false statements.  Although sanctions under Rule 11 are less efficient in this 
particular case than other sources of authority, sanctions under this rule for each of these 
filings is appropriate and can encompass all the forms of relief requested above: 
attorney’s fees, a fee payable to the Clerk of the Court, criminal contempt, and a fee 
payable to a special fund for victims of Backpage in Missouri. 
The Attorney General cannot ordinarily move for sanctions under this rule without 
serving Backpage and its counsel with a motion for sanctions and giving them 21 days to 
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withdraw the sanctionable filing.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2), (3).  But abiding by that 
procedural requirement would not serve the administration of justice here.  Backpage and 
its counsel can no longer correct the harm they created by withdrawing their fraudulent 
filings, because the case is closed and Backpage’s counsel have withdrawn.  Cooter & 
Gell, 496 U.S. at 398 (“Even if [Backpage] quickly dismisses the action, the harm 
triggering Rule 11’s concerns has already occurred.”). 
For this reason, if the Court declines to impose sanctions under other authority, the 
Attorney General moves for permission to expedite a motion under Rule 11.  This rule 
provides that the safe-harbor period lasts 21 days or “another time the court sets.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).  Because the 21-day period would serve no purpose, this Court should 
decrease the safe-harbor period from 21 days to zero days, and should deem this motion 
to be a timely motion for sanctions under Rule 11 as well.  In the alternative, this Court 
can consider Rule 11 sanctions sua sponte without any delay, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 
11(c)(3).  
RELIEF REQUESTED 
The Attorney General requests that this Court enter an order: 
1. requiring Backpage to show cause why it should not be held in criminal 
contempt; 
2. requiring Backpage and its counsel to show cause why civil sanctions should 
not be imposed against both, including but not limited to orders to: 
a. pay a fee into a restitution fund to be set up for the benefit of the 
Backpage’s victims in Missouri; 
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b. pay the Attorney General’s fees and costs; and 
c. compensate this Court for its expenses; 
3. permitting supplemental briefing on the amount of sanctions; and 
4. providing any other relief this Court deems just and appropriate. 
 
Dated:  July 16, 2018   Respectfully submitted, 
JOSHUA D. HAWLEY, 
Attorney General 
 
  /s/ D. John Sauer              
D. John Sauer, #58721 
  First Assistant and Solicitor 
Joshua Divine, #69875 
  Deputy Solicitor 
Attorney General’s Office of Missouri 
Post Office Box 899 
Jefferson City, MO 65102 
Tel: (573) 751-3321  
Fax: (573) 751-0774 
E-mail: John.Sauer@ago.mo.gov 
 
Counsel for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I certify that on July 16, 2018, I electronically filed this document with the Clerk 
of Court for the Eastern District of Missouri using the CM/ECF system. I also served this 
document by electronic mail and first-class on the following: 
James Condon Grant  
DAVIS AND WRIGHT LLP  
1201 Third Avenue  
Suite 2200  
Seattle, WA 98101-3045  
206-757-8096  
Fax: 206-757-7096  
Email: jimgrant@dwt.com 
 
Mark Sableman  
THOMPSON COBURN, LLP  
One US Bank Plaza  
505 N. 7th Street  
St. Louis, MO 63101  
314-552-6103  
Fax: 314-552-7103  
Email: msableman@thompsoncoburn.com 
 
Robert Corn-Revere  
DAVIS AND WRIGHT LLP  
1919 Pennsylvania Ave., NW  
Suite 800  
Washington, DC 20006-3401  
202-973-4200  
Fax: 202-973-4499  
Email: bobcornrevere@dwt.com  
 
Michael L. Nepple  
THOMPSON COBURN, LLP  
One US Bank Plaza  
505 N. 7th Street  
St. Louis, MO 63101  
314-552-6149  
Fax: 314-552-7149  
Email: mnepple@thompsoncoburn.com  
 
Robert Edward Miller  
DAVIS AND WRIGHT LLP  
777 108th AvE. NE  
Suite 2300  
Bellevue, WA 98004  
425-646-6189  
Fax: 425-646-6199  
Email: robertmiller@dwt.com  
 
Ronald Gary London  
DAVIS AND WRIGHT LLP  
1919 Pennsylvania Ave., NW  
Suite 800  
Washington, DC 20006-3401  
202-973-4200  
Fax: 202-973-4499  
Email: ronnielondon@dwt.com 
In addition, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing to be served by first-class 
mail on the last known address of the registered agent for Backpage.com, LLC: 
 
Backpage.com, LLC 
Via National Corporate Research, Ltd. 
1601 Elm St., Ste. 4360 
Dallas, TX 75201  
/s/ D. John Sauer 
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
D 
16 United States of America, 
1 7 Plaintiff, 
CR-18-465-PHX-D H 




J Backpage.com, LLC, 
Defendant. 
21 
22 Plaintiff, United States of America, and the defendant, Backp ge.com, LLC, 
23 hereby agree to dispose of this matter on the following terms and conditio s: 
24 1. PLEA 
25 The defendant will plead guilty to an Information charging the d fendant with a 
26 violation of 18 United States Code (U.S.C.) § 1956(h), Money Launderin Conspiracy, a 
27 Class C felony offense. 
28 
cc: AUSA, Defense Counsel, USPO 
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2. MAXIMUM PENAL TIES 
a. A violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h) is punishable by a m imum fine of 
$500,000 (or, if any person derived pecuniary gain from the offense, o if the offense 
resulted in pecuniary loss to a person other than the defendant, not more t an the greater 
of twice the gross gain or twice the gross loss), a maximum term of imp sonment of 20 
6 years, or both, and a term of supervised release of 3 years. A max· mum term of 
7 probation is five years. 
8 b. According to the Sentencing Guidelines issued pursuant to he Sentencing 
9 Reform Act of 1984, the Court shall order the defendant to: 
10 (1) make restitution to any victim of the offense pursua t to 18 U.S.C. 
11 § 3663 and/or 3663A, unless the Court determines that restitution ould not be 
12 appropriate; 
13 (2) pay a fine pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3572, unless the C urt finds that a 
14 fine is not appropriate; 
15 (3) serve a term of supervised release when required by atute or when 
16 a sentence of imprisonment of more than one year is imposed (with the understanding 
17 that the Court may impose a term of supervised release in all other cases); nd 
18 ( 4) pay upon conviction a $400 special assessment for each count to 
19 which the defendant pleads guilty pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3013. 
20 c. The Court is required to consider the Sentencing Guidelines n determining 
21 the defendant's sentence. However, the Sentencing Guidelines are adv"sory, and the 
22 Court is free to exercise its discretion to impose any reasonable sente ce up to the 
23 maximum set by statute for the crime( s) of conviction, unless there are sti ulations to the 
24 contrary that the Court accepts. 
25 3. AGREEMENTS REGARDING SENTENCING 
26 a. California And Texas Proceedings: It is the parties' ex ectation that, 
27 around the time the defendant enters a guilty plea in this case, co-defend nt Carl Ferrer 
28 will enter guilty pleas to Backpage-related charges in California and Tex s state court. 
- 2 -
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1 Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. ll(c)(1)(C), the United States and the de:tl dant stipulate 
2 that the defendant's guilty plea in this case is contingent upon the accept ce of Ferrer's 
3 plea agreements in the California and Texas matters. If either of those ple agreements is 
4 rejected, the defendant will be afforded an opportunity to withdraw the gu lty plea in this 
5 case. 
6 b. Timing Of Sentencing: The defendant agrees that sentenci g in this case 
7 may be delayed until the federal sentencing of co-defendant Carl Ferrer. 
8 c. Offset for Fine Pa The parties 
9 stipulate and agree that, to the extent the Court imposes a criminal fine ag inst any of the 
10 other organizational co-defendants in this matter, the defendant will receiv credit toward 
11 its criminal fine obligation (under 18 U.S.C. § 3612(i)) for any fine-rei ted payments 
12 made by such organizational co-defendants. 
13 d. Length Of Probationary Term: It is the parties' intention tha the defendant 
14 will cease to exist or operate following its entry of a guilty plea this matter. 
15 Nevertheless, pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(l)(B), the United States ill recommend 
16 that, if it appears the defendant will remain in existence and opera ion following 
17 sentencing in this case, the defendant be sentenced to a 60-month term of p obation. 
18 e. Restitution. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3663 and/or 3663A, the defendant 
19 specifically agrees to pay full restitution, regardless of the resulting loss a ount but in no 
20 event more than $500 million, to all victims directly or proximately armed by the 
21 defendant's "relevant conduct," including conduct pertaining to any dismi sed counts or 
22 uncharged conduct, as defined by U.S.S.G. § 1Bl.3, regardless of whethe such conduct 
23 constitutes an "offense" under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2259, 3663 or 3663A. he defendant 
24 understands that such restitution will be included in the Court's Order of Judgment and 
25 that an unanticipated restitution amount will not serve as grounds to withdraw the 
26 defendant's guilty plea or to withdraw from this plea agreement. 
27 f. Assets and Financial Responsibility. The defendant shal make a full 
28 accounting of all assets in which the defendant has any legal or equitable interest. The 
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1 defendant shall not (and shall not aid or abet any other party to) sell, hid , waste, spend, 
2 or transfer any such assets or property before sentencing, without the p or approval of 
3 the United States (provided, however, that no prior approval will be requi ed for routine, 
4 day-to-day expenditures). The defendant also expressly authorizes the United States 
5 Attorney's Office to immediately obtain a credit report as to the defend nt in order to 
6 evaluate the defendant's ability to satisfy any financial obligation impose by the Court. 
7 The defendant also shall make full disclosure of all current and projecte assets to the 
8 U.S. Probation Office immediately and prior to the termination of t e defendant's 
9 supervised release or probation, such disclosures to be shared with the .S. Attorney's 
10 Office, including the Financial Litigation Unit, for any purpose. Finally, the defendant 
11 shall participate in the Inmate Financial Responsibility Program to fulfi 1 all financial 
12 obligations due and owing under this agreement and the law. 
13 g. Acceptance of Responsibility. If the defendant makes full and complete 
14 disclosure to the U.S. Probation Office of the circumstances surrounding t e defendant's 
15 commission of the offense, and if the defendant demonstrates an cceptance of 













States will recommend a two-level reduction in the applicable Sentenc· g Guidelines 
offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). If the defendant has an offe se level of 16 
or more, the United States will move the Court for an additional one-lev 1 reduction in 
the applicable Sentencing Guidelines offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b). 
4. AGREEMENT TO DISMISS OR NOT TO PROSECUTE 
a. This office shall not prosecute the defendant for any offenses committed by 
the defendant, and known by the United States, in connection with the ubject matter 
described in the factual basis of this agreement. 
b. This agreement does not, in any manner, restrict the actions of the United 
States in any other district or bind any other United States Attorney's Offic . 
5. COURT APPROVAL RE UIRED· REINSTITUTION OF PR SECUTION 
- 4 -
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a. If the Court, after revtewmg this plea agreement, cone udes that any 
provision contained herein is inappropriate, it may reject the plea agreeme t and give the 
defendant the opportunity to withdraw the guilty plea in accordance with F d. R. Crim. P. 
11(c)(5). 
b. If the defendant's guilty plea or plea agreement is reject d, withdrawn, 
vacated, or reversed at any time, this agreement shall be null and void, th United States 
shall be free to prosecute the defendant for all crimes of which it then has ow ledge and 
any charges that have been dismissed because of this plea agreement shal automatically 
be reinstated. In such event, the defendant waives any and all objection , motions, and 
defenses based upon the Statute of Limitations, the Speedy Trial Act, o constitutional 
restrictions in bringing later charges or proceedings. The defendant under tands that any 
statements made at the time of the defendant's change of plea or sentenci may be used 
against the defendant in any subsequent hearing, trial, or proceeding ubject to the 
limitations ofFed. R. Evid. 410. 
15 6. WAIVER OF DEFENSES AND APPEAL RIGHTS 
16 The defendant waives (1) any and all motions, defenses, p obable cause 
17 determinations, and objections that the defendant could assert to the indictment or 
18 information; and (2) any right to file an appeal, any collateral attack, and any other writ 
19 or motion that challenges the conviction, an order of restitution or forfeitu e, the entry of 
20 judgment against the defendant, or any aspect of the defendant's sentence including the 
21 manner in which the sentence is determined, including but not limited o any appeals 
22 under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (sentencing appeals) and motions under 28 U.S .. §§ 2241 and 
23 2255 (habeas petitions), and any right to file a motion for modificatio of sentence, 
24 including under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). This waiver shall result in the di missal of any 
25 appeal, collateral attack, or other motion the defendant might file c allenging the 
26 conviction, order of restitution or forfeiture, or sentence in this case. Th·s waiver shall 
27 not be construed to bar an otherwise-preserved claim of ineffective assista ce of counsel 
28 or of "prosecutorial misconduct" (as that term is defined by Section II.B f Ariz. Ethics 
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1 Op. 15-01 (2015)). 
2 7. 
3 
DISCLOSURE OF INFORMATION 
a. The United States retains the unrestricted right to provide i formation and 
4 make any and all statements it deems appropriate to the U.S. Probation 0 fice and to the 
5 Court in connection with the case. 
6 b. Any information, statements, documents, and evidence that the defendant 
7 provides to the United States pursuant to this agreement may be us d against the 
8 defendant at any time. 
9 c. The defendant shall cooperate fully with the U.S. Probatio Office. Such 
10 cooperation shall include providing complete and truthful responses to q estions posed 
11 by the U.S. Probation Office including, but not limited to, questions relatin to: 
12 (1) criminal convictions, history of drug abuse, and menta illness; and 
13 (2) financial information, including present financial asse s or liabilities 
14 that relate to the ability of the defendant to pay a fine or restitution. 














a. Nothing in this agreement shall be construed to protect the 
administrative or civil forfeiture proceedings or prohibit the Unite States from 
proceeding with and/or initiating an action for civil forfeiture. Pursuant t 18 U.S.C. § 
3613, all monetary penalties, including restitution imposed by the Cou , shall be due 
immediately upon judgment, shall be subject to immediate enforcement y the United 
States, and shall be submitted to the Treasury Offset Program so that any fi deral payment 
or transfer of returned property the defendant receives may be offset nd applied to 
federal debts (which offset will not affect the periodic payment schedule) If the Court 
imposes a schedule of payments, the schedule of payments shall be merel a schedule of 
minimum payments and shall not be a limitation on the methods availabl to the United 
States to enforce the judgment. 
b. The defendant agrees to forfeit, and hereby forfeits, all intere t in any asset 
that the defendant owns or over which the defendant exercises contr 1, directly or 
- 6 -
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1 indirectly, as well as any property that is traceable to, derived from, fun ible with, or a 
2 substitute for property that constitutes the proceeds of the offense(s), or hich was used 
3 to facilitate the commission of the offense(s). Such property includes, bu is not limited 





Prosperity Bank account number x7188 
Compass Bank account number x3873 
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16 Such property further includes, but is not limited to, all right, title, and nterest in any 
17 funds remaining in the following IOL T A bank accounts at the conclusi n of litigation 
18 (with the understanding that the funds currently deposited in those IOLTA bank accounts 
19 may only be withdrawn by counsel based on the provision of legal services~: 
20 (1) First Republic Bank IOLTA Account x6180 
21 (2) First Republic Bank IOLTA Account x6255 
22 (3) First Republic Bank IOLTA Account x5978 
23 (4) All funds previously deposited in Wells Fargo I LTA account 
24 number x7091 to fund the criminal defense of Backp ge.com, LLC, 
25 Website Technologies, LLC, Posting Solutions LLC, Amstel River 
26 Holdings LLC, Ad Tech BV, and/or UGC Tech Group BV 
27 Such property further includes, but is not limited to, all right, title, and "nterest in any 
28 funds previously advanced to a bail bond service (with the understanding t at, should co-
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1 defendant Carl Ferrer not be required to post a bond in this matter, the defe dant will take 
2 immediate steps to recover any funds previously advanced to a bail bo 
3 surrender those funds to the United States for forfeiture). 
4 c. The defendant further agrees to waive all interest in any su h asset in any 
5 administrative or judicial forfeiture proceeding, whether criminal or civil, tate or federal. 
6 The defendant agrees to consent to the entry of orders of forfeiture for sue property and 
7 waives the requirements of Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure 32.2 and 3(a) regarding 
8 notice of the forfeiture in the charging instrument, announcement of t e forfeiture at 
9 sentencing, and incorporation of the forfeiture in the judgment. The de endant further 
10 understands and agrees that forfeiture of the assets is appropriate and in a cordance with 
11 the applicable forfeiture statutes, which may include Title 8 U.S.C. § 13t4(b), Title 18 
12 U.S.C. §§ 924(d), 981, 982 and 2253, Title 21 U.S.C. §§ 853 and 881~ and Title 28 
13 U.S.C. § 2461(c). I 
14 d. Forfeiture of the defendant's assets shall not be treated as satisfaction of 
15 any fine, restitution, cost of imprisonment, or any other penalty this cou~ may impose 
16 upon the defendant in addition to forfeiture. This agreement does not precl de the United 
17 States from instituting any civil or administrative forfeiture proceedin s as may be 
18 appropriate now or in the future. 
19 e. The defendant agrees to waive all constitutional and statutor challenges in 
20 any manner (including direct appeal, habeas corpus, double jeopardy or an other means) 
21 to any forfeiture imposed as a result of this guilty plea or any pending or completed 
22 administrative or civil forfeiture actions, including that the forfeiture onstitutes an 
23 excessive fine or punishment. The defendant agrees to take all steps as re uested by the 
24 United States to pass clear title to forfeitable assets to the United States, and to testify 
25 truthfully in any judicial forfeiture proceeding. The defendant acknow edges that all 
26 property covered by this agreement is subject to forfeiture as proceeds of i legal conduct, 
27 property facilitating illegal conduct, and substitute assets for property oth rwise subject 
28 to forfeiture, and that no other person or entity has a legitimate claim to the e items listed. 
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1 f. The defendant agrees not to file a claim to any of the listed 
2 civil proceeding, administrative or judicial, which may be initiated. he defendant 
3 further agrees that he/she will not contest civil, administrative or judicial fl rfeiture of the 
4 listed property. The defendant agrees to waive his/her right to notice o any forfeiture 
5 proceeding involving this property, and agrees not to file a claim or assist thers in filing 
6 a claim in that forfeiture proceeding. 
7 g. The government reserves its right to proceed against any re aining assets 
8 not identified either in this agreement or in any civil actions which are eing resolved 
9 along with this plea of guilty, including any property in which the defl ndant has any 
10 interest or control, if said assets, real or personal, tangible or intangible w re involved in 
11 the offense(s). 
12 h. The defendant hereby waives, and agrees to hold the gove ment and its 
13 agents and employees harmless from any and all claims whatsoever inc nnection with 
14 the seizure, forfeiture, and disposal of the property described above. Wit out limitation, 
15 the defendant understands and agrees that by virtue of this plea of guilty, the defendant 
16 will waive any rights or cause of action that the defendant might otherwife have had to 
17 claim that he/she is a "substantially prevailing party" for the purpose f recovery of 
18 attorney fees and other litigation costs in any related civil forfeiture proce ding pursuant 
19 to 28 U.S.C. § 2465(b)(l). 
20 9. ELEMENTS 
21 Money Laundering Conspiracy 
22 Beginning no later than 2004, and continuing through in or around arch 2018, in 
23 the District of Arizona and elsewhere: 
24 1. There was an agreement between two or more persons to ommit one or 
25 more of the crimes of Concealment Money Laundering ( 8 U.S.C. § 
26 1956(a)(1)(B)(i)), International Promotional Money Launderin (18 U.S.C. 
27 § 1956(a)(2)(A)),Transactional Money Laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1 57(a)), and/or 
28 International Concealment Money Laundering (18 U.S.C. § 1956(a) 2)(B)(i)); and 
- 10-
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2. The defendant became a member of the conspiracy knowing of at least one 
of its objects and intending to help accomplish it. 
FACTUAL BASIS 
a. The defendant admits that the following facts are true and th t if this matter 
5 were to proceed to trial the United States could prove the following acts beyond a 
6 reasonable doubt: 
7 
8 The website www.Backpage.com ("Backpage") was created in 200 . It eventually 
9 became the second-largest classified advertising website in the wo ld and, during 
10 its 14 years of existence, has derived the great majority of its rev nue from fees 
11 charged in return for publishing advertisements for "adult" and "esc rt" services. 
12 
13 The great majority of these advertisements are, in fact, adve isements for 
14 prostitution services (which are not protected by the First Amend ent and which 
15 are illegal in 49 states and in much of Nevada). Acting with t is knowledge, 
16 certain employees and representatives of Backpage.com, LL (who were 
17 authorized to bind the company with their actions) conspired to find ways to 
18 knowingly facilitate the state-law prostitution crimes being ommitted by 
19 Backpage's customers. For example, the company "moderation" 
20 processes through which Backpage would remove terms and pic res that were 
21 particularly indicative of prostitution and then publish a revised ver ion of the ad. 
22 Such editing did not, of course, change the essential nature of the illegal service 
23 being offered in the ad-it was merely intended to create a veneer of deniability 
24 for Backpage. These editing practices were only one component of an overall, 
25 company-wide culture and policy of concealing and refusing to officially 
26 acknowledge the true nature of the services being offered in Backp ge' s "escort" 
27 and "adult" ads. 
28 
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1 In addition to conspiring to knowingly facilitate the state-law prosf ution offenses 
2 being committed by Backpage's customers, certain employees and epresentatives 
3 of Backpage.com, LLC (who were authorized to bind the comp ny with their 
4 actions) also conspired to engage in various money laundering o fenses. Since 
5 2004, Backpage has earned hundreds of millions of dollars in revenue from 
6 publishing "escort" and "adult" ads. Over time, many ban s, credit card 
7 companies, and other financial institutions refused to do business ith Backpage 
8 due to the illegal nature of its business. In response, the 
9 employees and representatives found ways to fool credit card ompanies into 
10 believing that Backpage-associated charges were being incurre on different 
11 websites, to route Backpage-related payments and proceeds through bank accounts 
12 held in the name of seemingly unconnected entities (including but not limited to 
13 Posting Solutions, Website Technologies, and Cereus Propertie ), and to use 
14 cryptocurrency-processing companies (including but not limited to CoinBase, 











b. The defendant shall swear under oath to the accuracy of this statement and, 
if the defendant should be called upon to testify about this matter in t e future, any 
intentional material inconsistencies in the defendant's testimony rna subject the 
defendant to additional penalties for perjury or false swearing, which may e enforced by 
the United States under this agreement. 
APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S AUT ORIZED 
REPRESENTATIVE 
I am authorized to enter into a written plea bargain agreement and nter a plea of 
guilty on behalf of the defendant. 
26 I have read the entire plea agreement with the assistance I 
27 understand each of its provisions and I voluntarily agree to it on behalf oft e defendant. 
28 
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1 I understand that by entering my plea of guilty, the defendant shall aive its rights 
2 to plead not guilty, to trial by jury, to confront, cross-examine, and compel the attendance 
3 of witnesses, to present evidence in its defense, to remain silent and refuse to be a witness 
4 against itself by asserting its privilege against self-incrimination (if appli able), all with 
5 the assistance of counsel, and to be presumed innocent until proven g ilty beyond a 
6 reasonable doubt. 
7 I agree to enter this guilty plea as indicated above on the terms an conditions set 
8 forth in this agreement. 
9 I understand the nature of the charges to which the defendant is en ering its guilty 
10 plea. I further understand the nature and range of the possible senten e and that the 
11 defendant's ultimate sentence shall be determined by the Court after consideration of the 
12 advisory Sentencing Guidelines. 
13 The defendant's guilty plea is not the result of force, threats, assurances, or 
14 promises, other than the promises contained in this agreement. The defen ant voluntarily 
15 agrees to the provisions of this agreement and agrees to be bound a cording to its 
16 provisions. 
17 I understand that if the defendant is granted probation or placed on supervised 
18 release by the Court, the terms and conditions of such probation/supervi ed release are 
19 subject to modification at any time. I further understand that if the defend t violates any 
20 of the conditions of its probation/supervised release, its probation/supervis d release may 
21 be revoked and upon such revocation, notwithstanding any other pro ision of this 
22 agreement, its sentence otherwise may be altered. 
23 This written plea agreement, and any written addenda filed as atta hments to this 
24 plea agreement, contain all the terms and conditions of the plea. ny additional 
25 agreements, if any such agreements exist, shall be recorded in a separate document and 
26 may be filed with the Court under seal; accordingly, additional agreemen s, if any, may 
27 not be in the public record. 
28 
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1 I further agree on behalf of the defendant that promises, including ny predictions 
2 as to the Sentencing Guideline range or to any Sentencing Guideline f: ctors that will 
3 apply, made by anyone (including the defendant's attorney) that are not c ntained within 
4 this written plea agreement, are null and void and have no force and effect. 
5 I fully understand the terms and conditions of this plea agreement. I am not now 
6 using or under the influence of any drug, medication, liquor, or othe intoxicant or 
7 depressant that would impair my ability to fully understand the terms an conditions of 





Defendant's Authorized Represe tative 
12 APPROVAL OF DEFENSE COUNSEL 
13 I have discussed this case and the plea agreement with my client in etail and have 
14 advised the defendant of all matters within the scope of Fed. R. Cri . P. 11, the 
15 constitutional and other rights of an accused, the factual basis for and th nature of the 
16 offense to which the guilty plea will be entered, possible defenses, and th consequences 
1 7 of the guilty plea including the maximum statutory sentence possible. I have further 
18 discussed the concept of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines with the 
19 assurances, promises, or representations have been given to me or to the d fendant by the 









agreement. I concur in the entry of the plea as indicated above and that the terms and 
conditions set forth in this agreement are in the best interests of my clie t. I agree to 
make a bona fide effort to ensure that the guilty plea is entered in accorda 
requirements of Fed. R. Crim. P. 11. 
Date 
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1 APPROVAL OF THE UNITED STATES 
2 I have reviewed this matter and the plea agreement. I agree o behalf of the 
3 United States that the terms and conditions set forth herein are appropriat and are in the 



























ELIZABETH A. STRANGE 
First Assistant United States Atto 
District of Arizona 
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JOHN J. KUCERA 
Assistant U.S. Attorneys 
REGINALD JONES 
Senior Trial Attorney 
ACCEPTANCE BY THE COURT 
United States District Judge 
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iSUMMARY OF THE CASE AND REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Backpage.com hosts online classified ads.  Appellee, the Missouri Attorney 
General, issued Appellant Backpage.com, LLC a broad civil investigative demand 
(“CID”), invoking Missouri’s Merchandising Practices Act (the “MMPA”).  The 
CID did not inquire about anything within the MMPA or Backpage’s service or 
representations to consumers.  Rather, it focused on how Backpage screens, blocks 
or allows third-party ads under 47 U.S.C. § 230, which promotes such self-policing 
via immunity for websites from liability under all state law for third-party content.
Backpage sued to enjoin the CID as unlawful under the First Amendment 
and Section 230, seeking, initially, a preliminary injunction.  It later challenged 
new MMPA regulations adopted to target Backpage.  The AG moved to dismiss 
under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and the district court granted that 
motion.  Backpage appeals because the CID falls outside the extraordinary circum-
stances for Younger abstention.  Separately, even if this case fell within one of 
Younger’s categories, the AG’s pursuit of Backpage exhibits bad faith, further dis-
qualifying it under abstention principles.  The district court also abstained from 
considering the claims against the new regulations, despite the fact they are not 
part of any ongoing state proceedings.
Appellant requests 30 minutes for oral argument given the importance of the 
immunity Congress established for cases like this, and of the constitutional issue.
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ii
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 26.1 and 8th Cir. R. 26.1A, Backpage.com, LLC 
states it is a privately held, Delaware limited liability company that is a subsidiary 
of and owned by several other privately held companies, respectively:  IC Hold-
ings, LLC, Dartmoor Holdings, LLC, Atlantische Bedrijven C.V.; Kickapoo River 
Investments, LLC; Lupine Investments LLC; and Amstel River Holdings, LLC.  
No publicly held company owns any interest in Backpage.com, LLC or any of its 
parent companies.
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1JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The district court had jurisdiction over Plaintiff Backpage.com, LLC’s 
federal claims under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343, and entered final judgment dis-
missing all claims November 28, 2017.  Backpage.com timely noticed its appeal 
December 27, 2017.  This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 1292.
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
1. Whether the district court correctly dismissed Backpage.com’s consti-
tutional and statutory claims under the doctrine of Younger abstention.
Apposite Cases:
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 
584 (2013), Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229 (7th Cir. 2015), and Doe No. 
1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016).
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2STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The following facts from the Complaint are taken as true in reviewing the 
grant of the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss under F.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).  Plouffe 
v. Ligon, 606 F.3d 890, 893 (8th Cir. 2010).
A. Backpage.com
Backpage.com, LLC (“Backpage”), operates a classified advertising website 
which allows users to post ads in various categories, including buy/sell/trade, real 
estate, jobs, dating, and services, JA12-13; JA91-92; Backpage.com, LLC v. 
Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805, 813 (M.D. Tenn. 2013), organized by municipality 
and state.  JA91; Doe No. 1 v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 2016), 
cert. denied, 2017 WL 69715 (Jan. 9, 2017).  With millions of user-posted ads each 
month, Backpage.com is the country’s second-largest online classified ad service, 
after Craigslist.  JA91-92; Backpage.com, LLC v. McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 
1266 (W.D. Wash. 2012).  These services are Internet successors to classified ads 
found in newspapers for decades, which historically included adult-oriented online 
ads for dating, massages and escorts.
Users post through an automated interface with open-text fields for the ad’s 
title and text, and uploads for photos and videos.  JA92; see also McKenna, 881 
F. Supp. 2d at 1266.  Users provide all content for ads; Backpage.com does not 
dictate or require any content, although it blocks and removes content that violates 
Appellate Case: 18-1096     Page: 18      Date Filed: 03/06/2018 Entry ID: 4636547  
Case: 4:17-cv-01951-PLC   Doc. #:  73-3   Filed: 07/16/18   Page: 18 of 72 PageID #: 1120
3its posting rules or may be improper.  JA92, 93.  Users must affirmatively accept 
Backpage.com’s rules before posting, JA92-93; see Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 
813-14, and those seeking to post or access content in the dating category must first 
attest they are 18 years old or older (as was true for the former adult category).  
JA92-93; see McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1266.  These Terms of Use prohibit 
illegal acts and warn that improper posts will be reported to law enforcement and 
are subject to prosecution.  JA92-93.  
Backpage has long employed extensive measures to police user posts, which 
in addition to a “Report Ad” button and email address for users to identify suspect 
ads, JA93; see Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 814, have included automated filters 
employing approximately 100,000 terms, phrases, URLs, and email/IP addresses, 
and review by human moderators to block or remove content that violates the site’s 
policies.  See JA93; see also Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 814.  “Backpage.com also 
regularly works with local, state and federal law enforcement officials by 
responding to subpoena[s], providing … Internet search tools, and removing posts 
and blocking users …,” Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 814; see also JA93-94, efforts 
for which officials nationwide (including in Missouri) have commended Backpage.1
1  JA93-94, 106-107 (February 2013 St. Louis County police communication 
stating “Thank you very much, the information you provided was helpful.  * * * *  I 
am very happy and always have been with the level of cooperation I get when 
dealing with Backpage.”).
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4Nevertheless, while Backpage.com formerly had an “adult” services category 
(with an escorts subcategory), due to years of public pressure and censorship efforts 
by politicians and others, it was eliminated January 9, 2017.  JA92.  Backpage.com 
still provides a dating category, however (with subcategories for women seeking 
men, men seeking women, etc.).  See, e.g., http://stlouis.backpage.com/.  
B. Law Enforcement Efforts to Censor Online Advertising and 
Backpage.com
Notwithstanding Backpage’s cooperation with law enforcement, for almost a 
decade state attorneys general (“AGs”) and other politicians have sought to censor 
adult-oriented online classifieds—first targeting Craigslist, then Backpage—despite 
views of academic experts and others (including law enforcement) that shuttering 
websites is inferior to combatting trafficking by working with them and leveraging 
their resources to identify, investigate and prosecute those using the Internet for 
illegal conduct.2  Still, AGs and others persisted, and managed to censor some 
websites by public pressure and threats of sanctions—yet lost in court every time.
2  See, e.g., Dr. Kimberly Mehlman-Orozco, Opinion: Legislation Aiming 
to Stop Sex Trafficking Would Hurt Investigations (Jan. 31, 2018), 
www.hstoday.us/subject-matter-areas/law-enforcement-and-public-safety/legisla-
tion-stop-sex-trafficking-would-hurt-investigations (“law enforcement uses open-
access classified ad[] websites, such as Backpage.com, as a tool”).  See also danah 
boyd, Combating Sexual Exploitation Online: Focus on the Networks of People, not 
the Technology (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.mass.gov/ago/ docs/community/testi-
mony/db.pdf (“Going after specific sites … does nothing to address … supply and 
demand—it simply pushes [networks] to evolve and exploiters to … go further 
underground.”)).  JA152-157.
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5In 2008, the Cook County Sheriff sued, alleging Craislist.com “violate[d] 
criminal laws” as the country’s “single largest source for prostitution.”  Dart v. 
Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 962-63, 967-68 (N.D. Ill. 2009).  The court 
dismissed the case, holding websites like Craigslist are intermediaries that cannot 
be liable based on users misusing the service for unlawful purposes.  Id. at 967.  It 
also held Sheriff Dart was “simply wrong” in asserting all escort ads are for “illegal 
sexual services.”  Id. at 968.  Nonetheless, state AGs continued to demand that 
Craigslist close its adult category, and it capitulated in September 2010.3  The AGs 
then turned to Backpage, demanding it do the same,4 and continued ever since.5  
Additionally, Washington, Tennessee and New Jersey passed criminal laws 
targeting Backpage.com, but courts held they violated the First Amendment and 
were preempted by Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”), 
47 U.S.C. § 230.  McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1262; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805; 
Backpage.com, LLC v. Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097 (D.N.J. Aug. 20, 2013). 
3  See Michael A. Lindenberger, Craigslist Comes Clean: No More ‘Adult 
Services,’ Ever, TIME (Sept. 16, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/nation/ar-
ticle/0,8599,2019499,00.html.  JA159-161.
4  See Letter from state AGs (including Missouri) to counsel for Backpage.com 
(Sept. 21, 2010), http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2010_09/Back-
page_com9-20-2010.pdf.  JA163-165.
5  See, e.g., Letter from National Association of Attorneys General to counsel for 
Backpage.com (Aug. 31, 2011), http://www.naag.org/assets/files/pdf/signons/Back-
page%20WG%20Letter%20Aug%202011Final.pdf.  JA167-173.
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6In a series of cases over six years, courts across the country consistently held 
Backpage is protected under Section 230 and the First Amendment—including the 
district court from which this appeal arises.  In M.A. ex rel. P.K. v. Village Voice 
Media Holdings, LLC, 809 F. Supp. 2d 1041(E.D. Mo. 2011), it held Section 230 
foreclosed plaintiff’s claims despite allegations that Backpage.com’s structure and 
operation, alleged knowledge of site misuse, and exercise of editorial functions to 
screen and prevent improper content, somehow established liability.  See also, e.g., 
Backpage.com, LLC v. Dart, 807 F.3d 229 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 
46 (2016); Jane Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d 12; People v. Ferrer, 2016 WL 7237305 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2016) (“Ferrer I”); People v. Ferrer, No. 16FE024013 (Cal. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 23, 2017) (“Ferrer II”).  
Further, and particularly relevant to the civil investigative demand (“CID”) in 
this case, in May 2012 the U.S. Attorney for the Western District of Washington 
commenced investigating Backpage.com—purportedly for sex-trafficking, forced-
labor, and Mann Act violations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1589, 1591 & 2421 et seq.—through 
eight subpoenas broadly covering its operations, finances/revenues, personnel, and 
policies and practices for monitoring and blocking improper content.  The federal 
court orders on Backpage’s motion to quash remain sealed, but, in general, held the 
investigation exceeded the scope of the grand jury’s authority, found the subpoenas 
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7unduly burdensome, and expressed concern over the apparent lack of legitimate 
investigative purpose.  
C. Efforts of Missouri Attorneys General to Target Backpage.com
1. Both AG Hawley and His Predecessor Have Acknowledged 
Section 230 Immunizes Backpage 
Over the last half-decade, AGs have acknowledged Section 230 bars them 
from pursuing or investigating Backpage for state-law civil or criminal claims.  
JA15-16.  In July 2013, the National Association of Attorneys General (“NAAG”) 
wrote Congress, advocating amendment of Section 230 because courts apply it to 
“prevent[] State and local law enforcement [] from prosecuting” Backpage, and 
demanding “[t]his must change.”6  Proposed amendments were pitched as “main-
tain[ing] civil immunity” but allowing state and local governments “to criminally 
investigate [websites, and specifically Backpage.com] … for … prostitution or [] 
similar crimes.”7  Missouri’s former AG, Chris Koster, one of three NAAG 
Backpage Executive Committee members, spearheaded the effort.  See JA913.
6  See Letter from NAAG to Senators Rockefeller and Thune, and 
Congresspersons Upton and Waxman (July 23, 2013), https://digitalcom-
mons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1465&context=historical.  JA175-
179.
7  Memorandum from Attorneys General Koster, Jackley and Ferguson to State 
AGs (June 14, 2013), https://www.cdt.org/files/file/AG-Letter-Section-230.pdf.  
JA171-175.
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8More recently, Appellee AG Hawley, like his predecessor, admitted Section 
230 renders state authorities “powerless” to prosecute Backpage.8  As previously, 
Hawley joined other AGs in complaining the “problem persists” under Section 230 
that “state and local law enforcement [are] powerless … against … services, such as 
Backpage.com.”  JA613, 614.  If anything, the letter stresses nothing has changed 
since 2013, id., and seeks amendment of Section 230.  JA615.
2. Campaign Against Backpage Culminating in AG’s CID
Undeterred by established law and admissions of lack authority to pursue 
Backpage.com, AG Hawley launched yet another attack with the avowed purpose 
of shuttering the site.  In April 2017, he announced a new, “first in the nation” 
initiative using a consumer protection law—the Missouri Merchandising Practices 
Act, RSMo. § 407.010 et seq. (“MMPA”)—ostensibly to address trafficking, but, 
more specifically, to pursue Backpage.  See also infra § C.3.  He acknowledged 
resorting to the MMPA to avoid “more difficult” criminal charges, which are “hard 
to … prove up.”9  Despite purporting to leverage the MMPA, the AG stated he is 
looking for “[a]ny violations of law we may find [and] we can prosecute” through 
8  Letter from NAAG to Congresspersons Wicker, Schatz, Blackburn, and Doyle 
(Aug. 16, 2017), www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/Files/Briefing-Room/News-Re-
leases/CDA-Final-Letter.  JA613-618.  See also JA913.
9  Jordan Larimore, Attorney general seeks court’s help in Backpage investi-
gation, JOPLIN GLOBE (June 16, 2017), http://www.joplinglobe.com/news/lo-
cal_news/attorney-general-seeks-court-s-help-in-backpage-investigation/arti-
cle_ac84b87b-f364-5197-9ef2-b78dfbd0f33d.html.  JA188-190.
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9“[c]ivil and criminal penalties.”10  And he publicized this in the press even before 
contacting Backpage, Bott, supra note 10, and later touted his mission to use 
consumer protection law to “shut down” Backpage.com and “stop the company” 
from publishing user-created adult-oriented classifieds.11  
On May 10, 2017, the AG’s office served Backpage’s CEO, Carl Ferrer, a 
CID, JA892, directed jointly to Backpage and its executives and former owners, 
that sought to “inquire into … the Subjects12 in connection with [] sale or advertise-
ment, as defined in Section 407.010, RSMo., of commercial sexual conduct, other 
sexually oriented services, massage services, dating services,” and “other merchan-
dise,” to “determine whether the Subjects have used deception, fraud, false promise, 
10  Celeste Bott, Missouri attorney general to investigate Backpage with new 




11  See Jo Mannies, Missouri AG Hawley looking for state court’s help in going 
after alleged sex-trafficking website, St. Louis Public Radio (June 15, 2017), 
http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/missouri-ag-hawley-looking-state-court-s-help-
going-after-alleged-sex-trafficking-website#stream/0.  JA125-126.
12  “Subjects” is defined as Backpage.com LLC and Carl Ferrer, as well as 
Michael Lacey and James Larkin, and through cross-referenced definitions also 
“includes, but is not limited to … Camarillo Holdings LLC, New Times Media 
LLC or any other predecessors, successors, or other entity administering, owning, 
operating or controlling the website [or] affiliated websites from January 1, 2010 to 
the present[.]”  JA116.  Messrs. Lacey and Larkin are owners of Backpage’s former 
parent company; they have not held ownership interests in Backpage for more than 
two years.
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10
misrepresentation, unfair practice, or [] concealment, suppression, or omission … in 
connection” therewith.  JA893.  See also RSMo. § 407.010(4) (“merchandise” 
includes “services”).  Yet the CID does not focus on “merchandise” Backpage.com 
sells—i.e., online advertising services offered to users.  See, e.g., McKenna, 881 
F. Supp. 2d at 1266; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. at 830 (like newspapers, Backpage sells 
ad space, a forum, and users who post are “advertisers”).  It focused instead on 
Backpage.com’s user ads. 
The CID demanded extraordinarily broad production in 24 categories over 
eight years, including:  
a. Backpage.com’s and any affiliated entities’ ownership, management, 
organization, officers, and directors, and every employee or agent in-
volved in screening content;
b. All practices and decisions for reviewing, blocking, deleting, or 
modifying ads, either by automated filters or human moderators;
c. All efforts to review, verify, block, delete, disable, or flag user 
accounts;
d. All posting rules and limitations;
e. Policies, manuals, training materials, and guidelines;
f. Monthly and yearly ad counts for the (former) adult sections in the last 
three years (both Missouri and nationally);
g. Every adult-oriented posting blocked, deleted, or modified (including 
non-adult ads), with copies of each as submitted and/or published;
h. Monthly and yearly ad counts for the last three years in Missouri for 
several categories, including Massage, Dating, and Services/Miscel-
laneous, and the number deleted or blocked by any means;
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i. All data-retention, image-metadata, and image-hashing policies;
j. Annual revenue and profit the past five years, both total and for 
Massage, Dating, and Services/Miscellaneous; and
k. All of Backpage’s banks and account numbers.
See JA893-894.  
The CID threatened production “to other state and federal law enforcement 
agencies,” JA32, 115, despite MMPA prohibitions.  RSMo. § 407.060.1.  It also 
sought production back to 2010, beyond the MMPA’s five-year limitations period.  
See RSMo. § 516.120; Owen v. General Motors Corp., 533 F.3d 913, 921 n.6 (8th 
Cir. 2008).  Responding to the CID would require Backpage to search and produce 
an enormous volume of data at great burden, expense, and disruption to its business 
and services it provides.  JA94.
Given the CID’s June 7, 2017, return date, JA893, Backpage’s counsel con-
tacted the AG’s office on May 19, 2017, and requested an extension for his clients, 
expressly mentioning both Mr. Ferrer and Backpage.  See JA894.  The assigned 
assistant AG agreed and confirmed by email.  Id. (accepting counsel’s request that 
extension apply to his “clients”).  However, on June 15, 2017, the AG filed in St. 
Charles County Circuit Court a Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demand (the 
“Petition”).  JA180-186.  His office did not serve it on Backpage or contact its 
counsel, but promoted it to the media and on Twitter, with the AG proclaiming he 
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sued “to force Backpage.com to stop stonewalling” and “blithely def[ying] legal 
obligations to respond” to the CID.13  
Backpage’s counsel contacted the AG’s office, noting the Petition appeared 
to be an obvious mistake, as Backpage had no obligation to respond yet given the 
extension.  JA177-178.  But the AG’s office claimed it served Backpage a duplicate 
of the CID a week after the extension agreement, and asserted this allowed the 
Petition.  See id.  Backpage and Mr. Ferrer responded and objected to the CID on 
the previously agreed extended due date of July 7, 2017.  JA906.  Backpage also 
requested the AG’s office dismiss the Petition, without prejudice, but it declined, 
and instead amended it after the district court ruling in this case.  State of Mo. ex 
rel. Joshua Hawley v. Backpage.com, LLC, St. Charles Cty. Mo. Cir. Ct., No. 1711-
CC00589 (First Am. Pet., Jan. 26, 2018) (available on Mo. CaseNet).
3. New Regulations
While the AG pursued the CID, he also published a notice of proposed 
regulation under the MMPA entitled “Conducting Human Trafficking under False 
Pretenses,” 15 CSR 60-16.040 (“New Regulation”), https://www.ago.mo.gov/pro-
posed-rules, and adopted it four months later.  https://www.sos.mo.gov/CMSIma-
13  Larimore, supra note 9; see also Attorney General Hawley’s June 15, 2017 
tweet, https://twitter.com/HawleyMO/status/875358037040521217.  JA192.
Appellate Case: 18-1096     Page: 28      Date Filed: 03/06/2018 Entry ID: 4636547  
Case: 4:17-cv-01951-PLC   Doc. #:  73-3   Filed: 07/16/18   Page: 28 of 72 PageID #: 1130
13
ges/AdRules/moreg/2017/v42n17Sept1/v42n17.pdf, at 1272.  The New Regulation 
imposes civil and criminal liability:
 On any person who “directly or indirectly … advertise[s], 
sell[s], offer[s], or provide[s] any merchandise,” including 
any services, 
 If the merchandise “involves” “sexual conduct” for which 
“anything of value is given … or received,”
 Unless the person “expressly disclose[s]” that the merchandise, 
advertisements or offers are for “commercial sexual conduct.”  
15 CSR 60-16.040.  
The New Regulation incorporates the “commercial sexual conduct” defini-
tion from 15 CSR 60-16.010, and the MMPA’s “advertisement” definition, i.e., 
“attempt by publication, dissemination, solicitation, circulation, or any other means 
to induce, directly or indirectly, any person to enter into any obligation or acquire 
… any merchandise.”  RSMo. § 407.010(1).  It thus imposes liability on websites 
and other services if third-parties use them in connection with broadly proscribed 
sexual conduct (e.g., anything “directly or indirectly” “involving” sex for “anything 
of value”), absent the required disclosure (e.g., apparently, “our services involve 
commercial sexual conduct” or “this third-party ad involves commercial sexual 
conduct”).  The AG explained his authority for the New Regulation only by stating 
generically that his office “may make rules necessary to [the MMPA’s] 
administration and enforcement” and to “specify the meaning of terms.”  
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https://www.sos.mo.gov/CMSImages/AdRules/moreg/2017/v42n9May1/v42n9.pdf, 
at 719.  Yet the New Regulation does not define terms in the MMPA or concern 
acts or practices toward consumers within its scope as Missouri courts interpret it.14
D. Proceedings Below
Backpage filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for declaratory and injunctive 
relief under Section 230 and the First and Fifth Amendments, then moved for a 
preliminary injunction against the CID.  The AG moved to dismiss under F.R.C.P. 
12(b)(1) and (6) asserting, among other grounds, that the district court should 
abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).  Backpage later moved to 
amend to seek injunctive and declaratory relief, also under Section 230 and the First 
Amendment, against the New Regulation, which took effect October 30, 2017.15  
The AG opposed both motions.  Before briefing concluded on those motions for 
leave to amend and preliminarily enjoin, the district court granted the motion to 
dismiss the challenge to the CID under Younger.  JA896-918.  As to Backpage’s 
challenge to the New Regulation, the district court summarily denied the motions 
on that issue “as moot,” without analyzing how Younger abstention applied.  Back-
page timely appealed.  JA915-917.
14  See Ports Petrol. Co. v. Nixon, 37 S.W.3d 237, 240-41 (Mo. 2001) (en banc); 
Missouri ex rel. Nixon v. Progressive Bus. Publ’ns, Inc., 504 F. Supp. 2d 699, 707 
(W.D. Mo. 2007).
15  https://www.sos.mo.gov/CMSImages/AdRules/moreg/2017/v42n17Sept1/v42
n17.pdf, at 1272-73. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This case involves efforts to misuse Missouri’s investigative machinery to 
regulate and interfere with an online forum for communications, contrary to federal 
constitutional and statutory protections.  The AG served the CID despite knowing 
Section 230 and its embodiment of First Amendment principles preempt the AG 
from pursuing any criminal or civil penalties he may conceive against Backpage 
based on information he hoped to gain through the CID.  And he hurriedly 
petitioned to enforce the CID (even before the return date) in hopes of preventing 
Backpage from seeking protection in federal court.
In dismissing pursuant to Younger, the district court failed to appreciate that 
the Supreme Court narrowed Younger abstention to only three “exceptional” 
categories:  ongoing criminal prosecutions, civil enforcement actions “akin to a 
criminal proceeding,” and actions necessary to preserve state courts’ ability to 
perform judicial functions.  Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591-
94 (2013).  None of those circumstances apply here:  a petition to enforce the AG’s 
demand for information is neither a criminal prosecution nor a substantive enforce-
ment action that justifies abstention.  As this and other circuit courts have held, 
administrative subpoenas seeking “to obtain information about [a company’s] 
business practices” are not judicial proceedings requiring abstention.  Cedar Rapids 
Cellular Tel., L.P. v. Miller, 280 F.3d 874, 882 (8th Cir. 2002); Google, Inc. v. 
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Hood, 96 F. Supp. 3d 584 (S.D. Miss. 2015), vacated on other grounds, 822 F.3d 
212 (5th Cir. 2016).  Additionally, it is not a proceeding touching on the integrity of 
state court “judicial functions,” even where the AG has sought to enforce the CID.  
This final Younger category is limited to proceedings to effectuate judicial orders, 
not administrative efforts seeking to obtain such an order.
Even if this were a case where Younger might potentially apply, abstention is 
inappropriate where AG Hawley’s actions were undertaken with full knowledge his 
efforts are preempted by federal law, as an effort to suppress constitutional rights.  
Hawley, like his predecessor, acknowledged his actions are barred by Section 230, 
but nonetheless proceeded with the CIDs (and numerous press conferences and 
releases).  In holding preemption was not “facially conclusive,” the district court 
ignored overwhelming authority explicitly rejecting the AG’s theory for avoiding 
Section 230, and relied on extraneous and irrelevant “evidence.”  Even its assump-
tion that further factual inquiry is required is flawed, because the court improperly 
considered matters outside the complaint contrary to Rule 12(b)(6), and even then, 
incorrectly assumed the asserted facts would make a difference to the legal analysis.
Apart from all else, the AG’s actions are outside the scope of Younger 
abstention, as they are the very paradigm of bad-faith investigation.  The AG, 
brandishing promises to put Backpage.com out of business, pursued overly broad 
“investigation” under ill-fitting state regulations he knew to be preempted under 
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federal law.  In one of his many press statements, he explained he pursued this 
course because trying to assert criminal charges would be “hard to prove.”  And, in 
an apparent bid to defeat federal jurisdiction, he raced to court to enforce his CIDs 
despite having extended the time for responding.  Such duplicitous behavior is far 
afield from the local interests Younger sought to preserve.
Finally, dismissal of Backpage’s motions to amend its complaint and enjoin 
the New Regulation is clearly erroneous.  There is no basis for abstaining from a 
facial challenge to a regulation—the substance of which has been invalidated in 
multiple cases involving Backpage—that was not the subject of ongoing proceed-
ings.  Nevertheless, the district court denied the motions to amend and for prelimi-
nary injunction as “futile” without any analysis.  That decision is plainly wrong and 
must be reversed.
ARGUMENT
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This Court conducts “careful de novo review” to ensure “the district court did 
not abuse its discretion in abstaining” under Younger.  E.g., Castonguay v. Taff, 390 
F. App’x 619 (8th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).  It reviews de novo both allowance of a 
motion to dismiss, accepting the complaint’s allegations as true and construed in the 
light most favorable to the non-movant, Plouffe, 606 F.3d at 893, and legal issues 
relating to denial of preliminary injunction.  Factual findings on injunctive relief are 
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reviewed for clear error, and the exercise of the equitable judgment is reviewed for 
abuse of discretion.  Home Instead, Inc. v. Florance, 721 F.3d 494, 497 (8th Cir. 
2013); Chlorine Inst., Inc. v. Soo Line R.R., 792 F.3d 903, 913 (8th Cir. 2015).
II. THERE IS NO BASIS FOR ABSTENTION UNDER THE LIMITED 
EXCEPTIONS OF YOUNGER v. HARRIS AND SPRINT COMMUNI-
CATIONS v. JACOBS
Contrary to the magistrate’s ruling below, “a federal court’s ‘obligation’ to 
hear and decide a case is ‘virtually unflagging’” and “parallel state-court proceed-
ings do not detract from that obligation.”  Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. 
Ct. 584, 591 (2013) (quoting Colorado River Water Cons. Dist. v. United States, 
424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976)).  This is particularly the case for the Petition to enforce 
the CID, which is in effect an “administrative subpoena,” JA900, as it is not the 
kind of state-court proceeding that falls within the narrow exceptions that may 
support Younger abstention.  It is not “akin to a criminal prosecution” to “sanction” 
Backpage for violation of substantive law.  Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 592.  In holding 
otherwise, the district court violated the rule that it had “no more right to decline the 
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.”  Id. at 
590 (quoting Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821)).
A. Younger Abstention is a Narrow Exception to the Proper Exercise 
of Federal Jurisdiction  
Younger abstention “is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a 
District Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it,” Colorado River Water 
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Conservation District, 424 U.S. at 813, that applies only “three ‘exceptional 
circumstances’ … but no further.”  Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 593-94.  First, it “pre-
clude[s] federal intrusion into ongoing state criminal prosecutions.”  Id. at 591.  
And while the Younger Court explicitly expressed “no view about the circum-
stances under which federal courts may act when there is no prosecution pending in 
state courts at the time the federal proceeding is begun,” Younger, 401 U.S. at 41, it 
soon clarified federal courts have no obligation to abstain in that case.  Steffel v. 
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 462 (1974) (federal intervention before filing of a charge 
“does not result in duplicative legal proceedings or disruption of the state criminal 
justice system,” nor “reflect[s] negatively upon the state court’s ability to enforce 
constitutional principles”). 
Second, abstention lies in certain “civil enforcement proceedings” “akin to a 
criminal prosecution.”  Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 591-92.  This involves civil proceedings 
“in aid of and closely related to criminal statutes,” Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 
U.S. 592, 604 (1975), such as where a state provision seeks “to obtain compliance 
with precisely the standards … embodied in [] criminal laws.”  Id. at 605.
Third, abstention may apply in “civil proceedings involving certain orders … 
uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their judicial 
functions.”  Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 591 (citation omitted); New Orleans Pub. Serv., 
Inc. v. Council of New Orleans (“NOPSI”), 491 U.S. 350, 367-68 (1989).  In this, 
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like the other two categories, the Supreme Court has cautioned abstention is the 
“‘exception, not the rule,’” and that district courts retain a “virtually unflagging” 
obligation to hear and decide cases over which they have jurisdiction.  Id. at 359 
(quoting Hawaii Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984); Deakins v. 
Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 203 (1988) (citation omitted)). 
Notwithstanding this admonition, however, lower courts for a time expanded 
Younger to more and more proceedings by applying three factors set forth in 
Middlesex County Ethics Commission v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 
(1982):  whether proceedings (1) “constitute an ongoing state judicial proceeding,” 
(2) “implicate important state interests,” and (3) offer “adequate opportunity … to 
raise constitutional challenges.”  Id. at 432.  The Eighth Circuit in Sprint, like other 
courts, treated these three factors as Younger’s complete test for abstention, which 
contributed to the doctrine’s metastatic growth.  The Supreme Court reversed this 
Court’s reliance on Middlesex in support of Younger abstention, noting the 
“extraordinary breadth” of its approach, and using the case as a “guide [to] other 
federal courts.”  Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 593-94 (emphasis added).
The Court made clear the only three categories where Younger abstention 
might be appropriate are ongoing state criminal prosecutions, civil enforcement 
akin to criminal proceedings, and matters that uniquely [] further the state courts’ 
ability to perform judicial functions.  Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 591.  It stressed Younger 
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does not apply “outside these three ‘exceptional’ categories” that “define Younger’s 
scope.”  Id. (emphasis added).  See id. at 593-94 (emphasis added) (Younger 
“extends to the three ‘exceptional circumstances’ identified in NOPSI, but no 
further”).  The Middlesex criteria may be considered as “additional factors” only 
after finding a proceeding is of the type to which Younger applies.  Id. at 593.  
B. None of the Younger Categories for Abstention Apply
The district court abused its discretion in dismissing the case on abstention 
grounds because a Petition to enforce a CID falls into none of the categories 
recognized in Sprint.  There was no pending state criminal case, civil enforcement 
action “akin to a criminal proceeding,” or court order to enforce.  The district court 
improperly treated the Petition “triggering judicial oversight of the CID” as 
equivalent to a civil enforcement action to sanction Backpage for violating 
substantive law, JA902, and its application of Younger abstention in this 
circumstance is reversible error.
1. There is No Ongoing State Criminal Prosecution
The district court properly acknowledged that “neither party characterizes the 
state-court action [to enforce the CID] as a criminal proceeding,” and thus found it 
“need not address that Sprint category.”  JA899.  The same is true here.
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2. The District Court Erred in Deeming the Attorney General’s 
State Court Petition to Enforce the CID a “Civil Enforcement 
Proceeding” Under Younger
The district court erred in applying Younger based on a state action to enforce 
a CID.  For Younger to apply absent an actual criminal prosecution, there must be a 
pending civil enforcement proceeding that is both (1) “judicial in nature,” NOPSI, 
491 U.S. at 369-70, and (2) “akin to a criminal prosecution.”  Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 
592; Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604.  However, a CID that is an administrative subpoena, 
JA900, and a Petition to enforce it, meets neither of these criteria.  
A proceeding is “judicial in nature” when it “investigates, declares and 
enforces liabilities as they stand” on existing facts and laws.  NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 
369-70.  But the CID and Petition neither “declare” nor “enforce” liabilities. In-
stead, according to the district court, they involve merely a “require[ment that] the 
recipient ‘[] appear and testify, or [] produce relevant documentary material or 
physical evidence for examination.’”  JA900.  
A CID is not issued by courts or judges, but rather is sent unilaterally from 
the AG as part of his search for potential violations of Missouri law.  See RSMo. 
§ 407.040.  Such a CID decides no questions of liability, renders no binding judg-
ments, and is not overseen by impartial state officers.  Before Sprint, a few courts, 
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including this one, treated administrative subpoenas as proceedings under Younger,
16 but this is no longer good law after Sprint.  
That much is clear from a case very much like this one—the first case to take 
up post-Sprint the issue of whether CIDs functioning as administrative subpoenas 
are “ongoing state proceedings” under Younger.  In Google v. Hood, the district 
court held administrative subpoenas are, and always were, a “pre-litigation 
investigative tool” as opposed to a criminal or civil “action.”  96 F. Supp. 3d  at 595 
n.18.  This echoed pre-Sprint Fourth Circuit precedent that “distin[guished] … 
commencement of ‘formal enforcement proceedings,’ at which point Younger 
applies, versus the period of time when there is only a ‘threat of enforcement,’ 
when Younger does not apply.”  United States v. South Carolina, 720 F.3d 518, 527 
(4th Cir. 2013).17  Similarly, other courts have never required abstention on mere 
16 E.g., Kaylor v. Fields, 661 F.2d 1177, 1181-82 (8th Cir. 1981).  Two later un-
published district courts opinions extended this reasoning to civil subpoenas issued 
by AGs.  See J. & W. Seligman & Co. v. Spitzer, 2007 WL 2822208, at *5-6 
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2007); Cuomo v. Dreamland Amusements, Inc., 2008 WL 
4369270, at *9-10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2008) (citing Seligman).
17  The Supreme Court had previously rejected Younger when all that was pend-
ing was an investigation in Steffel, 415 U.S. at 462.  See also Mulholland v. Marion 
Cnty. Election Bd., 746 F.3d 811, 813 (7th Cir. 2014) (investigation was too pre-
liminary a proceeding to warrant Younger abstention in the wake of Sprint).
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issuance of an administrative subpoena, and have declined to abstain in favor of an 
administrative inquiry even where formal petitions had been filed.18
These decisions underscore how Younger’s second category includes only 
civil enforcement proceedings that are “akin to a criminal prosecution” in 
“important respects.”  Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 592 (quoting Huffman, 420 U.S. at 604) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  These “important” similarities the Supreme 
Court noted are that the state, acting as sovereign, must have formally charged the 
federal plaintiff with wrongdoing after completing the investigation.  See id.  Only a 
few types of proceedings have satisfied that demanding standard, such as state-
initiated proceedings to gain custody of children whose parents are accused of 
wrongdoing, to recover welfare payments, and to enforce civil rights laws.  See id. 
Thus “a federal court need not decline to hear a constitutional case within its 
jurisdiction merely because a state investigation has begun,” Mulholland, 746 F.3d 
at 817, which is all the AG’s CID to Backpage represents.  In the context of an 
18  See Louisiana Debating & Literary Ass’n v. City of New Orleans, 42 F.3d 
1483, 1487, 1490-91 (5th Cir. 1995) (rejecting abstention where complaint had 
been filed with agency, which “requested information” from federal plaintiffs).  See 
also Guillemard-Ginorio v. Contreras-Gomez, 585 F.3d 508, 511-12, 518-19 (1st 
Cir. 2009) (explaining investigation was “too preliminary” where agency had issued 
ex parte subpoenas, received response, and completed audit); Telco Commc’ns, Inc. 
v. Carbaugh, 885 F.2d 1225, 1227-28 (4th Cir. 1989) (no proceeding where agency 
received complaint and initiated investigation); Major League Baseball v. 
Butterworth, 181 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1338 (N.D. Fla. 2001) (no proceeding where 
attorney general issued administrative subpoenas), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. 
Major League Baseball v. Crist, 331 F.3d 1177 (11th Cir. 2003).  
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investigation, “Younger is inapplicable until a criminal [or civil enforcement] 
proceeding is actually commenced.”  O’Keefe v. Schmitz, 2014 WL 1379934, at *2 
(E.D. Wis. Apr. 8, 2014) (rejecting abstention in challenge to court-overseen pro-
cedure akin to grand jury investigation because “[i]t is an investigatory process, not 
an ongoing criminal prosecution or civil enforcement proceeding”), rev’d in part on 
other grounds, 769 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2014).
The AG’s CID is not preceded by a formal charge or complaint that the state, 
upon the conclusion of an investigation, has filed to sanction someone for violating 
the state’s substantive laws.  It is an isolated inquiry, filed in the earliest stage of an 
incomplete investigation into potential violations of the state’s civil laws.  It does 
not charge Backpage with wrongful acts in violation of the MMPA but, literally, 
asks it to “produce [] requested documentation and information.”  JA38.  It is more 
like a garden-variety discovery dispute, not a criminal prosecution. 
Nor is there anything here “akin to criminal prosecution.”  There is no state-
court enforcement action, and the AG admitted as much.19  In fact, there was never 
any state judicial proceeding that in any way involved enforcement of any state law 
against Backpage.  In this regard, a CID (or administrative subpoena) is not the civil 
19  JA226 (asserting State commenced investigation but “has not yet brought any 
civil claims or criminal charges against Backpage”); see also id. at JA234 (asserting 
AG has only “alluded to the possibility of a civil or criminal action against 
Backpage.com”).
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equivalent of an indictment.  See ACRA Turf Club v. Zanzuccki, 748 F.3d 127, 140 
(3d Cir. 2014) (Supreme Court has applied Younger only where state entity made 
formal filing).  
The district court nonetheless forced the AG’s investigation into the second 
Younger category by bootstrapping Missouri’s interests in its merchandising laws.  
JA898-899.  But the state’s general interest has no bearing on the threshold question 
whether a proceeding is criminal or civil.20 And even if the state’s asserted interest 
were relevant, the district court did not explain how this transforms a civil investi-
gative demand into a something “akin to a criminal proceeding.”
The fact that the AG filed a Petition to enforce the CID adds nothing to the 
claim for abstention.  The Petition “bear[s] close relationship” to the CID (which is 
civil, not “criminal in nature”) and is “in aid of and closely related to” the CID—not 
any Missouri “criminal statute.”  Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 591.  Where such matters are 
so intertwined with executive or administrative action that, together, they constitute 
a “unitary process,” they are treated identically for Younger purposes.  Id. at 592 
(quoting NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 369).  Thus, the initiation of judicial proceedings to 
enforce the CID is properly considered administrative, not judicial, in nature.
20  It implicates only the second Middlesex factor, which applies only as an 
ancillary “additional” consideration.  Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 593; see also supra 21.
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In this case, the CID and Petition are a “unitary process” for two reasons.  
First, threat of a petition gives CIDs their teeth, and is present from the moment a 
CID issues.  Second, the petition is, in effect, a request that a court review the CID.  
See RSMo. § 407.090.  Extending Younger abstention “to a state judicial proceed-
ing reviewing … executive action … would make a mockery of the rule that only 
exceptional circumstances justify a federal court’s refusal to decide a case in 
deference to the States.”  NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368. 
This requires reversal of the ruling below that Younger abstention was proper 
because the Petition “involves an investigation with the potential to culminate in …  
a formal complaint or charges” after subsequent steps—including charges, an 
enforcement action, and adjudication of it.  JA901 (emphasis added).  This prema-
turely presumes the conditions for Younger abstention have been met.  However, 
there must be state-court proceedings that “culminat[e] in the filing of a formal 
complaint or charges,” not just “potential” for some future proceeding that could 
possibly satisfy the Younger conditions set forth.
The district court’s error is revealed by its reliance on  Cedar Rapids Cellular 
Tel., L.P. v. Miller, 280 F.3d 874, 882 (8th Cir. 2002), a pre-Sprint Eighth Circuit 
case that based abstention on the Middlesex factors.  Yet even though Cedar Rapids 
Cellular was decided before Sprint, it correctly denied abstention for claims of a 
cellular carrier where the AG was merely attempting “to obtain information about 
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[its] business practices.”  Cedar Rapids Cellular, 280 F.3d at 882.  This Court noted 
that seeking information is “not a judicial proceeding” requiring abstention, 
“because it does not give the [AG], or anyone else, the power to declare whether 
those practices violate [state] law.”  It added that although the AG’s demand for 
information “may ultimately result in a judicial proceeding, there is no indication 
that a judicial proceeding was imminent at the time this case was filed.”  Id.
The decision below glossed over this conclusion and noted only that “Back-
page is the defendant in the pending state-court action.”  JA902-903.  This ignores 
the fact that abstention was granted in Cedar Rapids Cellular only as to other 
cellular carriers that were subject to civil enforcement actions for substantive 
violations of Iowa law.  280 F.3d at 877, 880.  Backpage has not been the subject of 
any charges or complaints, and as this Court held as to the carrier that was not 
subject to formal complaints, the fact that the AG’s “demand for information may 
ultimately result in a judicial proceeding” provides no basis for abstention.  Id. at 
882.  The same conclusion is warranted here.
3. The District Court Erred in Finding a Petition to Enforce the 
CID is “Uniquely in Furtherance” of State Judicial Functions
The district court also erred in finding the AG’s state-court petition satisfies 
the third Younger category, JA898, because a petition asking a court to enforce a 
CID does not “touch on a state court’s ability to perform its judicial function.”  
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Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 592.  It only affects the AG’s executive functions.21  The 
Supreme Court has put only two cases into this third Younger category of “civil 
proceedings involving certain orders … uniquely in furtherance of the state courts’ 
ability to perform their judicial functions,” NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 364, neither of 
which is like this one.  
The first, Juidice v. Vail, involved a federal claimant judgment debtor (Vail) 
who was jailed for contempt of court after failing to respond to a judicial subpoena 
served by a judgment creditor, missing a contempt hearing, and refusing to pay the 
fine imposed by the court.  430 U.S. at 329-30.  The federal suit against the state-
court judge who sanctioned him (Juidice) challenged the constitutionality of New 
York law authorizing imprisonment of contemnors of judicial orders.  Id. at 330.  
The Supreme Court refused to let the federal suit proceed as it challenged a core 
judicial power—contempt processes through which a state “vindicates the regular 
operation of its judicial system”— related to a pending state-court suit.  Id. at 335.
21  The case that created the third Younger category involved alleged contempt of 
a judicial, not an administrative, subpoena.  See Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 329 
n.2 (1977); see also id. at 335-36 (explaining why contempt for judicial subpoenas 
uniquely implicate Younger’s concerns).  Given Sprint’s admonition against extend-
ing Younger to situations not specifically covered by Supreme Court precedent, 
“[t]he key thing to observe … is that the Court has not extended [Juidice’s] logic to 
ordinary investigative activities by state law enforcement officials.”  Gil Seinfeld, 
At the Frontier of the Younger Doctrine: Reflections on Google v. Hood, 101 Va. L. 
Rev. Online 14, 26 (2015); see id. at 27-28 (federal claims involving CIDs are less 
an affront to state dignity than those involving state judicial orders).
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In the other case, Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987), Pennzoil 
won a state-court judgment on which it could immediately execute under Texas 
law, even though an appeal was pending or forthcoming, unless Texaco posted an 
appeal bond equal to the judgment—an existential threat because Texaco lacked the 
funds.  Id.  Texaco instead sued Pennzoil in federal court, arguing Texas’s scheme 
letting judgment creditors execute judgments pending appeal was unconstitutional. 
See id. at 4-7. The Supreme Court held the situation fit within the third Younger 
category because:
Both Juidice and this case involve challenges to the processes by 
which the State compels compliance with the judgments of its 
courts.  Not only would federal injunctions … interfere with the 
execution of state judgments, but they would do so on grounds that 
challenge the very process by which those judgments were 
obtained.
Id. at 13-14 (internal citation omitted).  The substance of Texaco’s federal claim 
attacked a core judicial power whose process (the appeal) was still unfolding when 
the federal suit was filed.  See id. at 16-17 & n.16.
Younger abstention applied in both Juidice and Pennzoil because judicial 
interests were jeopardized by federal claims.  See, e.g., Schall v. Joyce, 885 F.2d 
101, 109 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Pennzoil’s limiting principle is its focus on the special 
interest that a state has in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts.”).  
Conversely, Backpage’s federal claims do not challenge any Missouri court orders, 
let alone any uniquely in furtherance of state courts’ judicial functions.  Rather, 
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they address only an intrusive CID targeting speech that is statutorily and 
constitutionally protected under federal law. 
The AG might object to treating executive and judicial orders differently, that 
CIDs are as central to state executive authority as contempt sanctions and appeals 
are to state judicial authority—but the law has never recognized as much.  Both 
Juidice and Pennzoil rest on “unique[]” concern for core judicial functions, NOPSI, 
491 U.S. at 368, and the Younger categories are now closed to new situations, no 
matter how strong a state interest they implicate.  See Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 593.  
Executive interests are not what the third Younger category ever meant to protect, 
and the district court erred in holding otherwise. 
C. The Middlesex Factors Do Not Favor Preemption
As this case does not fit any of Sprint’s three “exceptional circumstances,” 
and thus does not fall within Younger and Sprint, the Middlesex factors are irrele-
vant.22  That said, the district court ignored the specifics of this case in basing its 
decision on Missouri’s ostensive “important interest in enforcing its consumer pro-
tection statutes” as a general proposition.  JA906 (quoting Cedar Rapids Cellular, 
280 F.3d at 879-80, and referencing second Middlesex factor).  
22  See Recovery Chapel v. City of Springfield, 2014 WL 4954111, at *2 (W.D. 
Mo. Oct. 2, 2014) (rejecting abstention claim because “Defendants only cite Eighth 
Circuit cases that predate Sprint … even though the Supreme Court … repudiated 
the Eighth Circuit’s approach to Younger”); see also Banks v. Slay, 789 F.3d 919, 
923 (8th Cir. 2015) (applying Sprint and reversing abstention order below).
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Whatever interest lies in enforcing the MMPA, it is not paramount in the 
Younger/Middlesex sense.  Rather, it must give way, with regard to the interest 
Congress identified in the CDA to eliminating chilling effects of imposing state-law 
liability on online intermediaries, “given the volume of material communicated 
through [the Internet], the difficulty of separating lawful from unlawful speech, and 
the relative lack of incentives to protect lawful speech.”  Universal Comm’n Sys., 
Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418-19 (1st Cir. 2007).  See also infra § III.A.1.  
Cf. Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1117-18 (W.D. Wash. 
2004).
Preemption aside, the diminished interest in MMPA enforcement is under-
scored by the CID’s focus on ads posted by Backpage.com users, which does not 
concern “merchandise” Backpage offers (nor representations or ads by Backpage 
for it) in the form of an online forum for user ads—the Internet equivalent of ad 
space in a newspaper.  JA084, 35-36.  The district court also overlooked the extent 
to which the State’s interest in enforcing its consumer protection laws is diminished 
by how the MMPA itself is structured to impose liability only on parties who 
advertise, not intermediaries that publish or distribute ads.  See RSMo. 
§ 407.020.2(1).
Appellate Case: 18-1096     Page: 48      Date Filed: 03/06/2018 Entry ID: 4636547  
Case: 4:17-cv-01951-PLC   Doc. #:  73-3   Filed: 07/16/18   Page: 48 of 72 PageID #: 1150
33
III. THE DISTRICT COURT MISAPPLIED YOUNGER’S EXCEPTIONS 
IN DETERMINING ABSTENTION WAS PROPER
Even if the district court’s ruling did not require reversal on other grounds 
(i.e., no “civil enforcement proceeding” or proceeding “uniquely in furtherance of” 
state-court judicial functions), Younger has no application where a challenged state 
action is (1) “undertaken with no reasonably objective hope of success,” or (2) “in 
retaliation for the [] exercise of constitutional rights.”  Phelps v. Hamilton, 59 F.3d 
1058, 1065 (10th Cir. 1995) (internal citations omitted).  Here, the AG investigation 
was undertaken “with no expectation of convictions, but only to discourage exercise 
of protected rights,” Rivera-Schatz v. Rodriguez, 310 F. Supp. 2d 405, 410 (D.P.R. 
2004) (quoting Carbone v. Zollar, 845 F. Supp. 534, 538 (N.D. Ill. 1993)), given 
Section 230’s preemptive effect, and the protections provided by the First Amend-
ment.23  The district court also erred in failing to find bad faith where the Attorney 
General explicitly announced he was targeting protected speech with which he 
disagrees, issued a CID despite previously acknowledging limits on his authority 
23  Even though the constitutional issues were fully briefed below (JA78-83, 
551-553, 576-584, 635-637, 659-661), the district court did not even mention the 
First Amendment, and thus did not consider the extent to which it curtails AG 
actions—including issuance of a CID—in retaliation for Backpage engaging in pro-
tected speech, or how that affects the AG’s “objective hope of success” in enforcing 
the CID.  Cf. DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383 U.S. 825, 829 (1966) (“[T]he First 
Amendment prevents use of the power to investigate … to probe at will and without 
relation to existing need.”).  See also In re Grand Jury Subpoenas Duces Tecum, 78 
F.3d 1307, 1312 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Citizens State Bank, 612 F.2d 
1091, 1094 (8th Cir. 1980).
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under Section 230, and despite limits the MMPA itself imposes, and proceeded 
precipitously and deceptively in filing the state court enforcement action.
A. The District Court Misapplied Section 230 in Holding Preemption 
Does Not Defeat Younger Abstention in this Case
Even if some Sprint category applied, courts have held Younger abstention is 
improper if state action is plainly preempted, e.g., Midwestern Gas Transmission 
Co. v. McCarty, 270 F.3d 536, 539 (7th Cir. 2001); Communications Telesystems 
Int’l v. California PUC, 196 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 1999), and will not abstain if 
preemption is “facially conclusive.”  Chaulk Servs. v. Massachusetts Comm’n 
Against Discrimination, 70 F.3d 1361, 1369-70 (1st Cir. 1995); Norfolk & Western 
Ry. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm’n, 926 F.2d 567, 573 (6th Cir. 1991).  This Court has 
recognized this principle as well, even if it has yet to apply it.  See Cedar Rapids 
Cellular, 280 F.3d at 880.  It should do so here, because “abstention should be used 
only in the extraordinary and narrow circumstances where it would clearly serve an 
important countervailing interest,” Ass’n for Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Olson, 
713 F.2d 1384, 1390 (8th Cir. 1983), which does not exist “where … preemption is 
‘readily apparent.’”  Gartrell Constr. v. Aubry, 940 F.2d 437, 441 (9th Cir. 1991).
1. The District Court Properly Acknowledged Section 230’s 
Preemptive Effect But Misapplied It
The district court refused to apply Younger’s federal preemption exception 
because it found Section 230’s bar against the AG’s authority to apply state law to 
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Backpage not “facially conclusive,” and that holding otherwise required “detailed 
legal analysis” and “factual inquiry,” JA911, but that is not the case.  No fewer than 
eight courts—including this district court in a prior case—have found Section 230 
immunizes Backpage.24  State officials (and private litigants) routinely make claims 
in the vein of those the AG alleged and the district court accepted here, and courts 
have not hesitated to reject them as a matter of law under the CDA.
Section 230(c)(1) holds that “[n]o provider … of an interactive computer 
service shall be treated as the publisher … of any information provided by another 
information content provider,” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1), while Section 230(e)(3) ex-
pressly preempts state-law liability based on third-party content, whether civil or 
criminal, against services such as Backpage.com.25  Consensus holds that this 
applies expansively,26 and it has been held this immunity “significantly restricts” 
“state and local law enforcement agencies’ ability to prosecute Internet platforms.”  
Google v. Hood, 96 F. Supp. 3d at 597-98.  Some 300-plus cases have applied 
24  M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1047-55; Doe ex rel. Roe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 
104 F. Supp. 3d 149, 157-58 (D. Mass. 2015), aff’d, Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 12, 20-
22; McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1271-75; Hoffman, 2013 WL 4502097, at *8; 
Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d at 823-25; Ferrer I, 2016 WL 7237305, at *3-6; Ferrer II, 
No. 16FE024013.
25  Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006); Doe v. 
GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 2003).  
26  See Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 791 (8th Cir. 2010); M.A., 809 
F. Supp. 2d at 1048; Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 18; Almeida, 456 F.3d at 1321; see also 
Google v. Hood, 822 F.3d at 220.
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Section 230 to protect online providers from state-law claims based on third-party 
content.
It is settled law that Backpage.com is an interactive computer service pro-
vider under Section 230, e.g., M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1048-49, and posts by its 
users are the essence of “information provided by another content provider.”  Id. at 
1050-53; see also Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 17-21; Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 3d at 823.  
Section 230 thus ousts the AG of authority completely, unless—and only if, and to 
the extent that—Backpage.com requires unlawful content or generates it itself, 
either directly or by hiring others.  Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. 
Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc).  But that is 
not the case here, where Backpage provides a form where users decide what to 
upload (or not).  See supra 2-3.
The district court’s refusal to apply Younger’s preemption exception based on 
the CDA relied solely on contentions that the AG can avoid Section 230 by alleging 
“measures to conceal the illegality of ad[s] [for] commercial sex” by Backpage, and 
that it “actively participated in the creation or development of information [] on the 
website.”  JA908.  As to the former, courts repeatedly have rejected this “conceal-
ment” theory as attacks on the website’s structure and/or on application of Back-
page’s editorial discretion by which it deletes or blocks content that violates the 
website’s posting rules.  It was expressly rejected in Ferrer I, which held that if, 
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through editorial prerogatives, Backpage’s “alleged content ‘manipulation’” was 
altering ads “from being illegal to legal,” Section 230 applied.  2016 WL 7237305, 
at *7 (“[T]his behavior is exactly the type … the CDA encourages through … imm-
unity.”).  In M.A., Judge Mummert rejected similar claims that Backpage erected a 
“veil of legality” for ads its users post.  809 F. Supp. 2d at 1044, 1050. 
Most recently Ferrer II held deleting terms supposedly to “sanitize” ads is 
not “material contribution to [] offensive content” that defeats Section 230 im-
munity.  Slip op. 14.27  It also held Section 230 immunity could not be lost based on 
“overall course of conduct,” especially where Backpage did nothing to “require” 
offensive content, or on claims the site “‘manipulated’ ad[s] to evade law enforce-
ment detection.”  Id. 16-17.  The holding below that Section 230 is not “facially 
conclusive,” based on the AG’s concealment allegations, is error under settled law.
As to claims that “Backpage actively participated in the creation or develop-
ment” of illegal advertisements, because it “identified posts likely involving illegal 
commercial sex,” “solicited the[ir] posting,” and “revised the content … to limit 
law-enforcement attention, and then posted them to [its] website,” JA908, 911, 
here, too, the district court credited what other courts previously rejected as a matter 
27  The court reached these conclusions even though prosecutors relied on the 
Report of the U.S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations into Back-
page (the “PSI Report”), just like the AG did here (as improperly allowed by the 
district court—see infra § III.A.2).
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of law.28  As an initial matter, these allegations by the AG of so-called “aggressive 
solicitation” of illegal ads and “active participation” in their “creation” were based 
on a Washington Post report (and related material the AG’s office said it somehow 
obtained) regarding marketing by an overseas contractor for Backpage-affiliated 
sites “outside the U.S.,”  which plainly is not a basis for an investigation or claims 
by the AG here. 29  But more importantly, even these types of activities—involving 
content originating with third-parties that may be reposted at Backpage.com, after 
application of the same editorial deletions to remove material violative of the Terms 
of Service—have been held to fall within Section 230 immunity.
In Ferrer I, the court held that when “third parties provided the content for 
the original ad[s]” posted to a given site, republication without any addition that 
itself created illegality was not content creation, thus Section 230 immunity applied.  
See 2016 WL 7237305, at *3, *4, *6.  As later stated in Ferrer II, slip op. 17, “the 
28  And, as shown, to the extent it is alleged these activities were for purposes of 
concealing ads from “law enforcement attention,” courts have rejected that as basis 
for avoiding Section 230 immunity.  See supra 36-37.
29  See http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/long-story-short/video/nbc-news-exclu-
sive-inside-backpage-com-s-global-adult-ad-sales-operation-981487683699.  These 
facts were “facially” apparent from the evidence the AG adduced.  See, e.g., JA471 
(listing URLs clearly from U.K.); JA532-533 (email about leads from sites in 
England, Indonesia, and Romania); JA540-542 (referring to user post from “South 
Kensington,” England).  See also generally JA448-455 & JA471-544.  The only 
connections between the contractor and Backpage’s U.S. operations, as the AG’s 
own documents made clear, are that it handled moderation of U.S. ads for a time 
(JA525-527), and pursued leads for employment ads (JA522-524).
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act of extracting the content from the original ad and/or … physically posting [it] on 
a new site” is not content creation, but rather enjoys Section 230 immunity.  See 
also id. 16.  To whatever extent Backpage’s overseas contractor asked individuals 
who posted on other websites if they wanted to post the same ads on Backpage-
related sites, such activity would not constitute content creation under settled law.  
In these respects, the district court is wrong that “Doe No. 1 is distinguishable 
because [it] focused on Backpage’s posting standards” while “Hawley alleges that 
Backpage’s activities exceeded that of a mere publisher of third-party content.”  
JA910.  See Doe No. 1, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 157 (“Singly or in the aggregate, the 
allegedly sordid practices of Backpage … amount to neither affirmative partici-
pation in an illegal venture nor active web content creation.”).
Ultimately, “any activity that can be boiled down to deciding whether to 
exclude material that third parties seek to post online is perforce immune under 
section 230.”  Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1170-71.  Accusations against a website 
over its efforts to review, screen, block or edit third-party postings cannot override 
Section 230 immunity, which protects “traditional editorial functions … such as 
deciding whether to publish … or alter content.”  Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 18 
(quoting Zeran v. America Online, 129 F.3d 327, 330 (4th Cir. 1997)).  The district 
court’s refusal to give Section 230 its preemptive effect because Backpage “revised 
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the content of … posts” to comport with its editorial policies and terms of use, 
JA911, was clear error.
2. The District Court Relied on Improper Evidence in Order to 
Abstain Under Younger
The district court’s only other basis on which it held preemption “not facially 
conclusive,” involving AG allegations that Backpage’s “own employees actively 
participated in the creation of [] advertisements,” JA910, was erroneous.  First, it 
improperly considered extraneous material attached to the AG’s motion to dismiss.  
JA895, JA910-911.30  Second, even if such materials were properly considered, 
they do not undermine Younger’s preemption exception.
a. The District Court Erred when it Failed to Apply the 
Rule 12(b)(6) Standard
Because Younger abstention was invoked in the AG’s motion to dismiss, the 
district court should have applied Rule 12(b)(6), rather than Rule 12(b)(1), or any 
hybrid thereof.  A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(1) challenges the jurisdiction 
of the court in which the case is brought.  Accord City of Benkelman v. Baseline 
Eng’g Corp., 867 F.3d 875, 878 (8th Cir. 2017).  Abstention, conversely, is rooted 
in an assumption that the court has jurisdiction over the case that it can abstain from 
exercising—a court cannot abstain from exercising jurisdiction it does not have.  
30  These materials included the January 2017 Report of the Senate Permanent 
Subcommittee on Investigations (“PSI Report”), and a July 11, 2017 article from 
the Washington Post and materials related to it (“Avion Documents”).
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See NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 358-59.  As the Supreme Court noted with regard to 
subject-matter jurisdiction, “precedent makes clear that whether a court has [] juris-
diction … is distinct from whether a court chooses to exercise” it.  Carlsbad Tech., 
Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009).31  While this Circuit has not yet 
addressed this issue, a number of Circuit and other courts have expressly applied 
Rule 12(b)(6) in holding Younger dismissal is for failure to state a claim.32  
The district court’s reliance on the PSI Report and Avion Documents to 
abstain under Younger was improper under Rule 12(b)(6), because matters outside 
the complaint can be considered only when they are attached to or relied on by the 
complaint, see Whitney v. Guys, Inc., 700 F.3d 1118, 1128 (8th Cir. 2012), which 
was not the case here.  Further, the PSI Report and Avion Documents do not 
address jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), but do “nothing more than oppose the 
allegations in the Complaint.”  Erler v. Graham Packaging, 2014 WL 6463338, at 
*2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 17, 2014).  The district court thus erred when it relied on the PSI 
31  Thus Younger abstention “cannot form the basis for the proposition that a 
court lacks jurisdiction.  It can only be used to request that a court abstain[] from 
exercising such jurisdiction.”  Wal-Mart Stores v. Rodriguez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 200, 
204 (D.P.R. 2002).  See also Nivens v. Gilchrist, 444 F.3d 237, 257 n.7 (4th Cir. 
2006) (“Younger abstention ‘does not arise from lack of jurisdiction in the District 
Court’”); Weekly v. Morrow, 204 F.3d 613, 614-15 (5th Cir. 2000) (same).
32  E.g., Newsome v. Broward Cty. Pub. Defenders, 304 F. App’x 814, 815-16 
(11th Cir. 2008) (affirming dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure 
to state a claim under Younger); Peralta v. Leavitt, 56 F. App’x 534, 535 (2d Cir. 
2003) (affirming decision below to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) based on Younger).
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Report and Avion Documents to find Backpage’s preemption argument not 
“facially conclusive,” JA910-911, and is alone sufficient for this Court to reverse.  
See Union Elec. Co. v. Energy Ins. Mut. Ltd., 689 F.3d 968, 970-71 (8th Cir. 2012); 
Snelling v. Publishers Clearing House, Inc., 90 F. App’x 973, 974 (8th Cir. 2004).
b. The District Court’s Reliance on Materials Outside the 
Complaint Was Clear Error
Even if the district court could consider extraneous evidence the AG offered, 
it erred in holding the PSI Report and Avion Documents bar finding that Younger’s 
preemption exception applies based on Section 230.  Claims that the PSI Report 
“demonstrates Backpage specifically designed its website’s operations to facilitate 
and conceal known criminal activity” (JA230) rehashes allegations that dozens of 
courts have rejected under Section 230.33  The PSI Report’s main “revelation” is 
that Backpage never actually created any illegal content.  Stripped of pejorative 
characterizations, the Report simply recounts use of automated and manual filtering 
and blocking of inappropriate or offensive content, which is precisely what Section 
230 protects.34  And courts have held as much even months after the PSI Report.  
33  E.g., Doe No. 1, 817 F.3d at 21 (“appellants’ … claims address the structure 
and operation of the Backpage website … that are part and parcel of the overall 
design and operation … which reflect choices about what content can appear … and 
in what form” which constitute “editorial choices that fall within the purview of 
traditional publisher functions” immunized by Section 230).
34  See Ferrer I, 2016 WL 7237305, at *7 (“[T]he People are essentially 
complaining that Backpage staff scrubbed the original ad, removing any hint of 
illegality.  If this was the alleged content ‘manipulation,’ the content was modified 
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Ferrer II, slip op. 1, 13-14.  The district court’s view that reaching the same con-
clusion here would require “detailed legal analysis” and “factual inquiry,” JA911, is 
clearly erroneous.
As to the Avion Documents, all allegations relating thereto have absolutely 
no connection to Missouri—rather, all of the conduct they reflect occurred overseas 
and involved ads on websites in other countries.  See supra 38 & n.29.  Such 
activities cannot form the basis for investigation or claims by the AG under the 
MMPA—the State law he relies on for authority to issue the CID—as it applies 
only to acts that take place “in or from the state of Missouri.”  RSMo. § 407.020(1).  
All of this was discernible from the face of the documents the AG submitted 
(improperly on a 12(b) motion).  See supra 38 n.29.  Thus, here too, no “detailed 
legal analysis” or “factual inquiry” was necessary for the district court to accept 
Backpage’s showing that Section 230 preemption precluded abstention under 
Younger.  Its failure to do so was reversible error.
from being illegal to legal.  Surely the AG is not seeking to hold Defendants liable 
for posting a legal ad; this behavior is exactly the type of ‘good Samaritan’ behavior 
that [Section 230] encourages ….”); M.A., 809 F. Supp. 2d at 1044, 1050 
(Mummert, J.).  See also supra note 24 (citing cases that have held Section 230 
immunizes Backpage).
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B. The Attorney General’s Conduct Surrounding the CID is 
Quintessential Bad Faith
The district court improperly excused the AG’s bad faith in abstaining under 
Younger.  “In this context, bad faith generally means” the AG acted: (1) “without a 
reasonable expectation of obtaining a valid conviction” or, (2) “to retaliate for or 
discourage the exercise of constitutional rights.”  Lewellen v. Raff, 843 F.2d 1103, 
1109 (8th Cir. 1988) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  As the 
Supreme Court held in Dombrowski v. Pfister, courts must enjoin State “threats to 
enforce [] statutes … not … with any expectation of securing valid convictions, but 
rather … to employ arrests, seizures, and threats of prosecution … to harass ... and 
discourage” the exercise of First Amendment rights.  380 U.S. 479, 481 (1965).  
Younger does not override this fundamental principle.  Krahm v. Graham, 461 F.2d 
703, 707 (9th Cir. 1972).  “The state does not have any legitimate interest in [] such 
a prosecution,” and Younger’s deference to certain state proceedings is 
“inapplicable” when officials act for illegitimate purposes.  Lewellen, 843 F.2d at 
1110 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Google v. Hood is instructive.  The Mississippi Attorney General issued a 
broad administrative subpoena to Google purportedly to investigate violations of 
state consumer protection laws.  96 F. Supp. 3d at 589.  The AG “spoke publicly 
against Google on multiple occasions about his disapproval of Google’s practices,” 
engaged in a campaign to pressure Google to change its practices, and signed onto 
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the 2013 letter to Congress admitting Section 230 precluded pursuing claims 
against Google.  See id. at 592-93, 597-98.  Based on these facts, the district court 
concluded the AG issued the subpoena in bad faith as part of “an effort to coerce 
Google to comply with his requests regarding content removal,” and Younger 
abstention was therefore improper.  Id. at 595.35  
Attorney General Hawley’s pursuit of Backpage is similarly in bad faith.  As 
in Hood, his conduct and statements leave no doubt the CID merely targets 
Backpage’s publication of third-party content and editorial decisions, to inhibit or 
“shut down” the website for speech he finds offensive.  The AG has, in fact, made 
no secret of this.  He stated in his press release his intent to use the MMPA “as a 
means to stop the company,”36 and proclaimed on Twitter his focus on Backpage’s 
alleged “connection to” human trafficking—not any kind of deceptive “merchan-
dising” or the MMPA.37  See JA19-20; JA66-67, 85-86.  Courts frequently find 
such statements relevant evidence of an official’s bad faith.38
35  The Fifth Circuit affirmed that abstention pursuant to Younger was inappro-
priate but reversed on other procedural grounds.  See 822 F.3d at 228.
36  AG Hawley to Backpage: There is no First Amendment right to engage in 
human trafficking (July 12, 2017), https://ago.mo.gov/home/ag-hawley-to-back-
page-there-is-no-first-amendment-right-to-engage-in-human-trafficking.  JA208.
37  AG Hawley’s tweet (July 11, 2017, 6:05PM), https://twitter.com/HawleyMO/ 
status/884941668855812097.  JA210.
38  E.g., Google v. Hood, 96 F. Supp. 3d at 595; Black Jack Distrib., Inc. v. 
Beame, 433 F. Supp. 1297, 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (finding bad faith and granting 
preliminary injunction based in part on defendant’s statement that it investigated 
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By contrast, Postscript Enterprises v. Peach, 878 F.2d 1114 (8th Cir. 
1989)—a pre-Sprint case the district court cited in abstaining under Younger 
(JA912-913)—did not involve such harassment in violation of First Amendment 
freedoms.  In Peach, this Court held bad faith was not established by a city 
attorney’s isolated statement that he would “run [plaintiff in the federal action] out 
of business,” because it was not paired with “great and immediate” irreparable 
injury.  878 F.2d at 1116 (quoting Younger, 401 U.S. at 46).  That has no bearing 
here, where a CID issued not just as a publicity stunt but expressly to chill 
Backpage’s First Amendment rights, loss of which, “for even minimal 
periods … unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”  Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 
347, 373 (1976); see also Backpage v. Dart, 807 F.3d at 231, 239 (First 
Amendment violated by actions of sheriff who sought to “crush Backpage”).  In this 
case, the AG’s actions only drive the point home.
with goal to “close the [plaintiff’s] stores or force them to abandon the sale of 
sexually oriented materials”); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey, 215 F. Supp. 3d 520, 
522-24 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (noting the Massachusetts AG’s “comments and actions 
before she issued the CID” “cause[] the Court concern and present[] the … question 
of whether [the AG] issued the CID with bias or prejudgment”).  Cf. Lewellen, 843 
F.2d at 1112 n.10 (bad faith where “prosecutor has pursued highly questionable 
charges against the plaintiff apparently for the sole purpose of gaining publicity”).
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1. Acknowledgement of Section 230’s Preemptive Effect and 
the Inherent Limits of the MMPA Reveal Bad Faith
As far as acting “without a reasonable expectation” of a successful outcome, 
the AG knows Section 230 preempts his pursuit of Backpage.  He and his office 
have admitted Section 230 bars state prosecution of Backpage.  In a recent letter to 
Congress, JA613-618, Hawley urged amendment of Section 230 because, under the 
law as it stands, state authorities are “powerless to act against online classified ad 
services, such as Backpage.com.”  JA614.39  The fig leaf credited by the district 
court of the AG sending a separate letter proclaiming his ability to pursue online 
content providers, JA912-913, does not undercut his bad faith in pursuing 
Backpage.com, an acknowledged host of others’ content.  The AG is also certainly 
aware of the extensive Section 230 and First Amendment case law rejecting any 
grounds for liability the AG could pursue.  This includes the decision in his own 
backyard in M.A., as well as all the other cases involving Backpage (and similar 
online service providers) outlined above.40  
39  Four years ago, Attorney General Koster signed onto the same letter as the 
Mississippi AG in Google v. Hood, acknowledging that “federal law significantly 
restricts his ability to take action of the sort in question here,” which the district 
court found to be compelling evidence of bad faith in that case.  See 96 F. Supp. 3d 
at 597-98; JA15-16.  The district court declined to deem Hawley bound by his 
predecessor’s admissions, JA913, but even if not binding, AG Hawley has 
independently expressed the same position as his predecessor.  The district court 
simply ignored his doing so.
40  See Mulholland, 746 F.3d at 818 (reversing district court decision to abstain 
given bad faith of local officials who were “well aware” a court previously rejected 
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The extent to which the AG makes the MMPA the basis for the CID also 
calls into question the integrity of his investigation.  The MMPA concerns decep-
tive representations or practices by merchants advertising to consumers.  The CID 
investigates no such thing.  Instead, it focuses on Backpage’s editorial policies and 
ads posted on the website by third-party users.  Using the MMPA as an excuse to 
pursue “any civil or criminal claims” the AG can find against Backpage, with the 
admitted purpose of avoiding “more difficult” strictures of criminal law, is not good 
faith.  Compare Lewellen, 843 F.2d at 1112 n.10 (noting AG institution of pro-
ceeding “on grounds for which no authority existed strongly suggested … ‘bad 
faith’ exception to Younger [] appl[ies]”).  
The AG’s reliance on the MMPA also disregards its protection for publishers, 
see RSMo. § 407.020.2(1), and his stated intent to share information obtained via 
the CID with other state and federal officials, despite the MMPA bar against doing 
so, see JA24; RSMo. § 407.060.1, also calls into doubt whether it is a proper 
vehicle for his actions.  The district court simply ignored this. 
similar attempts to enforce law at issue); Nobby Lobby, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 970 
F.2d 82, 88 (5th Cir. 1992) (local officials’ attempts to investigate and prosecute 
“raise[d] a strong inference of bad faith” “in light of” controlling prior authority).  
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2. The AG’s Machinations in Petitioning the State Court to 
Enforce the CID Evidence Bad Faith
Bad faith is also apparent in the manner by which the AG sued Backpage to 
compel CID responses when no response was due.  The AG agreed to extend the 
deadline for the CID as to both Mr. Ferrer and Backpage, then filed the Petition 
before the agreed-upon date.  See JA22-23.  His office claimed it granted an exten-
sion only for Mr. Ferrer, but that ignores emails confirming the extension, which 
show counsel requested it on behalf of “my clients,” i.e., Backpage and Mr. Ferrer, 
and that the AG’s office agreed.  JA177-178.  
Any assertion that the extension applied to only Mr. Ferrer defies logic.  A 
second copy of the CID was served on Backpage’s corporate agent on May 26, 
2017, see JA264, a week after the extension agreement.  The second CID is identi-
cal to the first, served on Mr. Ferrer as Backpage’s CEO.  All the CID’s requests 
call for documents from Backpage.  Both versions also set the same deadline.  
Thus, the AG’s position was apparently that, after granting Ferrer a one-month 
extension to respond regarding production of Backpage documents, he could, at the 
same time, demand that Backpage itself produce the same documents, in less than 
two weeks’ time.  This is patent nonsense.  And if not duplicitous, it at least violates 
the MMPA’s requirement for a “reasonable time” to respond.  RSMo. § 407.040.1.
The district court brushed this aside in a single-sentence ipse dixit that this 
did not reflect bad faith, JA913, based on misplaced reliance on this Court’s 
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decision in Aaron v. Target Corp., 357 F.3d 768, 779 n.7 (8th Cir. 2004), in which 
federal plaintiffs sought to avoid invocation of Younger by one party (a municipal 
defendant) based on bad acts of a different party (Target).  However, all but one of 
the examples of alleged misconduct involved relatively trivial actions.41  None of 
this, however, remotely resembles a public official’s publicity-seeking effort to 
harass Backpage in violation of its First Amendment rights.
More importantly, bad faith is evident in that the AG cannot trigger Younger 
by preemptively filing a Petition to enforce a CID that is not even due.  Such a 
filing should not constitute pending state-court action for abstention at all, see supra 
§ II.B, but it certainly manifests bad faith.  The AG’s actions are no different than 
issuing a CID with a 30-day deadline, and suing after one day simply to create 
grounds to evade federal review of unconstitutional actions.  A state-court action 
filed to obstruct federal jurisdiction does not implicate the concerns for comity that 
are the “moving force behind Younger,” see Cedar Rapids Cellular, 280 F.3d at 
881, and should have barred abstention under Younger’s bad faith exception.
41  Only one such act comes close to arguably misleading conduct such as that 
here, and even then, the victim was the City—not the plaintiff.  See id. n.8 
(evidence that “Target told the city it might abandon the properties because it had 
been unable to reach an agreement with the property owners ... but no [such] 
discussions had taken place between the parties”).
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IV. EVEN IF YOUNGER ABSTENTION APPLIES TO BACKPAGE’S 
CHALLENGE TO THE CID, IT WAS ERROR TO DISMISS ITS 
CHALLENGE TO THE AG’S NEW REGULATION
The district court abused its discretion when it denied Backpage’s motions to 
amend and to preliminarily enjoin the New Regulation.  Buder v. Merrill Lynch, 
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 644 F.2d 690, 694 (8th Cir. 1981).  As to the motion 
to amend, a district court “should freely give leave when justice so requires,” 
F.R.C.P. 15(a)(2); see also Buder, 644 F.2d at 694 (citing Rule’s “liberal 
amendment policy”), and the AG’s only argument for denial had nothing to do with 
abstention—rather, it rested on belief that amendment was “futile,” for the same 
reasons given for why the challenge to the New Regulation should not prevail on its 
merits.  JA802 (“For the reasons stated in … Opposition to … Second Motion for 
Preliminary Injunction, the Court should deny … leave to amend ….”).  As to the 
motion to preliminarily enjoin the New Regulation, no suggestion was ever made 
that that facial challenge satisfies the test for Younger abstention.  See JA751-801, 
passim.  The district court was silent on these points in denying the motions as 
moot.
The district court’s summary dismissal ignores the fact that there is no 
proceeding at all implicating the New Regulation, which did not become effective 
until October 30, 2017.  See supra 14 & n.15.  Although it is clearly drafted with 
Backpage in mind—indeed, it operates precisely the same as previously invalidated 
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Washington, Tennessee, and New Jersey laws—and is actively subjecting 
Backpage to potential liability, chilling protected speech, e.g., JA686-691, 694-698, 
701-707, 710-716, there is no enforcement action pending.
Abstention is especially improper where, as here, a plaintiff invokes federal 
court jurisdiction for a facial constitutional challenge.  Courts have long recognized 
the “limited” scope of abstention for facial challenges, “abstention being improper 
when the issues are within the purview of the First Amendment” and “statutes are 
justifiably attacked on their face as abridging free expression as applied for the 
purpose of discouraging protected activities.”  Burton v. City of St. Louis, 309 
F. Supp. 1078, 1079-80 (quoting Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 489-90) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “[A]bstention should be used only in the extraordinary 
and narrow circumstances where it would clearly serve an important countervailing 
interest,” Ass’n for Retarded Citizens of N.D. v. Olson, 713 F.2d 1384, 1390 (8th 
Cir. 1983), which generally is lacking for facial constitutional challenges.
Bad faith also precludes Younger abstention here, as well.  The AG adopted 
the New Regulation in derogation of the MMPA, and crafted grounds for potential 
liability that so closely track the statutes invalidated in McKenna, Cooper, and 
Hoffman there can be no question the purpose was to pressure Backpage and chill 
speech at its website, regardless of constitutionality or Section 230 preemption.  As 
the Supreme Court held in Dombrowski, courts must enjoin “threats” intended not 
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as a legitimate enactment that can be validly enforced, but that use “prosecution 
under color of the statutes to harass ... and discourage” the exercise of First 
Amendment rights.  380 U.S. at 482.
The New Regulation would hold Backpage and other websites liable for 
hosting and publishing third-party content based on accusations about the content 
itself, which is precisely what Section 230 preempts.  See Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 
at 824.  As with the other invalidated state laws, the New Regulation “reinforces 
service providers’ incentives to restrict speech and abstain from self-regulation,” 
McKenna, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 1273 (quoting Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333); Cooper, 939 
F. Supp. 2d at 824-25, and uses operative terms identical or functionally equivalent 
to those in the invalidated Washington, Tennessee and New Jersey laws.  See 
JA686-691, 694-698, 701-707, 710-716.  Adopting regulations despite being “well 
aware” courts have previously rejected similar state action has been held to 
evidence bad faith.  See Mulholland, 746 F.3d 818.  For all these reasons, disposing 
of the motions for leave to amend and to preliminarily enjoin the New Regulation 
was error.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Plaintiff-Appellant Backpage.com, LLC 
respectfully requests that this Court grant this appeal, reverse the district court’s 
order dismissing the challenge to the Attorney General’s CID, and order the district 
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court to rule on Backpage’s preliminary injunction motions.  Backpage further 
respectfully requests that, regardless of Younger’s applicability to the challenge to 
the CID, this Court should order the district court to resume proceedings on the 
challenge to the Attorney General’s New Regulation.
Respectfully submitted,
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The motion to withdraw filed by counsel of record for Backpage.com,LLC is granted.   
Backpage.com, LLC is advised that it may not proceed in this appeal without counsel.  Notice is  
provided to Backpage.com, LLC's CEO, Carl Ferrer, and his counsel, Nanci L. Clarence, that an  
appearance from counsel to represent Backpage.com, LLC is required for this appeal to proceed.   
Counsel should enter his or her appearance within 30 days from the date of this order. 
The pending deadline for the filing of the reply brief, due June 7, 2018, shall remain in  
effect. 
       
       May 15, 2018 
 
 
Order Entered Under Rule 27A(a):  
Clerk, U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.  
____________________________________  
        /s/ Michael E. Gans  
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